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This thesis examines the functional management role of the Project Manager with 
respect to the Foreign Military Sales process associated with the sale of new tactical 
wheeled vehicles. An effective FMS implementation process is becoming more crucial to 
the encouragement and sustainment of United States defense companies, and for the 
modernization of allied forces. A comparative analysis of the sale of the new Family of 
Medium Tactical Vehicles to Thailand and Kuwait, was conducted to identify the role of 
the Project Manager and develop lessons learned and recommendations for issue 
resolution. Both cases were analyzed from five different perspectives: 1) comparative 
analysis of the PMO's actions in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance phases, 2) functional 
analysis of the security assistance agencies involved in the FMS vehicle process, 3) 
functional management role analysis of the PM, 4) ethical considerations concerning 
FMS and the PM, and, 5) an analysis of the impact of FMS on the industrial base. 
Conclusions drawn from these analyses reveal that the functional management role of the 
PM is vital to the successful completion of FMS transactions. Adoption of the 
recommendations in this thesis should result in improved project management and project 
effectiveness in future Foreign Military Sales agreements. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the functional management role of 
the PM with respect to the FMS process associated with the 
sale of new tactical wheeled vehicles, utilizing a 
comparative analysis of the sale of the new FMTVs to 
Thailand and Kuwait. The role of the PM is evaluated from 
five different perspectives: 1) comparative analysis of the 
PMO's actions in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) 
phases, 2) functional analysis of the security assistance 
agencies involved in the FMS vehicle process, 3) functional 
management role analysis of the PM, 4) ethical 
considerations concerning FMS and the PM, and, 5) an 
analysis of the impact of FMS on the industrial base. 
Lessons learned are developed and recommendations presented 
for improved FMS management efficiency. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The United States (U.S.) international sale of military 
weaponry and equipment has increased in importance as a 
result of changes in both the domestic and worldwide 
climates. Domestically, a sharp decrease in the defense 
budget, coupled with a decline in the industrial base, has 
precipitated a heightened interest in the international .sale 
of military equipment. Increased tensions worldwide have 
also led to aggrandized international sales, as the U.S. has 
sought to enhance the military posture of its friends and 
allies.   Thus,  issues surrounding the FMS of military 
equipment have become more important as foreign countries 
seek procurement of these items from the United States. 
Inherent in the procurement programs of many countries, 
lie plans for the modernization of their tactical wheeled 
vehicle fleets. In conjunction with these plans, customer 
countries have sought out the U.S. for the acquisition of 
these vehicles through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program. Because these sales involved the procurement of 
older equipment already in the DoD inventory, these FMS 
transactions were previously accomplished without much 
involvement from the Project Manager (PM) of the U.S. 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicle program. 
Since Operation Desert Storm, however, there has been 
an explosion of interest in the FMS of newer weapon systems. 
In many cases, U.S. allies have expressed interest in 
procuring systems that have not been fielded to active U.S. 
units. One such weapon system, the ubiquitous truck - 
outshined many defense items as the equipment hero of the 
Gulf War. As a result, many countries are now seeking 
vehicles from the United States. As a consequence of this 
increased worldwide interest, PMs are now realizing that FMS 
is an important aspect of their project management 
responsibilities. 
With regard to the FMS of new production equipment, 
such as the Family Of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs), 
however, the functional management role of the PM has been 
ill-defined. Although project management has been in place 
for several years, little guidance has been provided 
concerning the actual role of the PM during the FMS process 
for the sale of new production vehicles. These new systems 
are managed by the PM, rather than the Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center country managers, who are 
assigned to manage the sale of excess and obsolete 
equipment. Additionally, the PM has not been resourced to 
manage FMS transactions. Consequently, the PM must provide 
FMS direction using little guidance, and from resources 
within project assets. 
In analyzing the sale of the FMTVs to foreign 
Governments, the PM plays an important part in the FMS 
process. Analysis of these sales has demonstrated a need to 
determine the functional management role of the PM during 
the conduct of the FMS process. Determination of this role 
will result in increased interest by friendly countries in 
procuring tactical wheeled vehicles from the U.S. and will 
enhance the implementation of future FMS transactions 
concerning other transportation systems to foreign 
Governments. 
C.   THESIS OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this research is to determine 
the functional management role of the PM with respect to the 
FMS process associated with the FMS of new tactical wheeled 
vehicles. The role of the PM will be analyzed by a case 
study of the FMS of the Family of Medium Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles (FMTVs) to Thailand and Kuwait. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research will answer the following Primary and 
Subsidiary questions. (Appendix A provides specific answers 
to each question.) 
1. Primary 
What should be the functional management role of the PM 
in the FMS process for new tactical wheeled vehicles? 
2. Subsidiary 
a. What security assistance agencies were 
primarily involved with the new vehicle FMS process, and 
what activities of these agencies were actually performed by 
the Project Management Office? 
b. What are the ethical considerations inherent 
in FMS cases for the PM, and what is their impact on the 
process? 
c. What is the impact of FMS on the industrial 
base? 
d. What  are  the  lessons  learned  from  the 
Thailand and Kuwait FMS cases? 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
The scope of this thesis is limited to determining the 
xfunctional management role' of the PM by analyzing the 
actions of the Project Management Office (PMO) during the 
FMS of new FMTVs to Thailand and Kuwait in 1993. The term 
'functional,' as applied in this thesis, is limited to 
denoting a sociological reference, rather than connoting an 
Army acquisition function. Thus, analysis and determination 
of the PM role will be performed by analyzing the actions of 
military members within the PMO (Colonel level, Army 
acquisition command). The term "PMO," however, refers to the 
collective actions of all members within the PMO who 
contributed to the FMS transactions. 
This research is also limited to an analysis of new 
production FMTVs. Associated regulations, policies, and 
directives pertaining to the FMS of new vehicles will be 
identified and discussed. Agencies concerned with FMS, as 
well as, the documents that are used in the current process 
for new FMTVs, will also be described. Because the FMTVs 
have not been fielded to active U.S. forces yet, information 
regarding the FMS of these vehicles is limited to the most 
recent pending FMS cases involving Thailand and Kuwait. 
Since Kuwait had not completed their FMS negotiations with 
the U.S., some information regarding the Kuwaiti FMS case 
was unavailable. 
F.   METHODOLOGY 
Research included review of all documentation 
associated with the role of the PM in the FMS of new 
tactical wheeled vehicles to foreign countries. Foreign 
Military Sales statutes, Army policies, and regulations were 
reviewed. Information was obtained from the Defense 
Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), and the 
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). Interviews 
were conducted with personnel from the following: Tank- 
Automotive Command (TACOM), the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency (DSAA), the Defense Institute of Security Assistance 
Management (DISAM), Department of the Army Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Logistics (DA DCSLOG) , U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command (USASAC), and the U.S. contractor for the 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. 
After all of the research was conducted and information 
gathered, the current new tactical wheeled vehicle FMS 
process was synthesized. Current functions within this 
process were then evaluated by using the FMS cases of the 
sale of FMTVs to Thailand and Kuwait. Using this as a basis, 
a comparative and functional analysis of the PM's role 
during the tactical wheeled FMS process was conducted by 
comparing and contrasting the two FMS cases. Following 
these presentations, three other analyses were also 
performed: a functional analysis of the security assistance 
agencies involved in the FMS vehicle process, an analysis of 
the ethical considerations regarding the actions of the PM 
during FMS transactions, and the impact of FMS on the 
industrial base. Conclusions and lessons learned drawn from 
these analyses were identified with appropriate 
recommendations proposed for effective implementation of 
future vehicle FMS transactions. 
G.   ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I discusses the background and objective of 
this thesis. 
Chapter II introduces the concept of security 
assistance, FMS, and the FMS process. It discusses security 
assistance, and various procurement possibilities available 
to  foreign  countries.  This  chapter  also  provides  an 
identification and  discussion of regulations and policies 
affecting the sale of new tactical wheeled vehicles. 
Chapter III discusses FMS, identifying the current FMS 
process for new tactical wheeled vehicles. Subsequent to 
this process identification, a description of the FMS cases 
concerning the sale of the FMTVs to Thailand and Kuwait is 
presented. Both case descriptions are presented with 
respect to the PM, the FMS process, and functions performed 
by various agencies and activities. 
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the Thailand and 
Kuwait FMS cases. Both cases were analyzed from five 
different perspectives: 1) comparative analysis of the PMO's 
actions in the LOA phases, 2) functional analysis of the 
security assistance agencies involved in the FMS vehicle 
process, 3) functional management role analysis of the PM, 
4) ethical considerations concerning FMS and the PM, and, 5) 
an analysis of the impact of FMS on the industrial base. 
Chapter V draws conclusions from the analyses and 
identifies lessons learned. 
Chapter VI proposes recommendations for the effective 
implementation of future vehicle FMS transactions, and 
concludes with recommendations for future research. 

II.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
A.   HISTORY 
For decades, global violence and continuous threats to 
world peace have marred the face of U.S. foreign policy. 
Victories in both World Wars I and II have served only to 
provide a temporary respite from an ever-volatile, changing 
world in which conflicts have continued to arise. 
Insurgencies have plagued underdeveloped areas, backed by a 
Communist challenge whose goal was world domination. 
Previously, Communism continued its thrust by initiating 
overt aggression, internal subversion, and economic 
penetration. Furthermore, it was backed by countries that 
continued to proliferate a nuclear arsenal capable of 
obliterating the entire civilization. Because of these 
exogenous factors, the U.S. was thrust into a position of 
world leadership and developed foreign policies to impede 
the ever advancing threat of Communism. Consequently, the 
U.S. migrated from a policy of isolationism to one in which 
it became an active participant in security assistance 
programs [Ref. 3: p. 5]. 
During the last ten years, the geopolitical climate of 
the world has continued to drastically change, inciting a 
renewed look into the realm of security assistance. With the 
advent of the political and economic liberalization of the 
Soviet Union, and the subsequent demolition of the Berlin 
Wall, a new "World Order" began. While the breach between 
East and West Berlin was eliminated, cries of freedom were 
ringing throughout the former satellite states of the Soviet 
Union. The Russian Bear was caged, and now an era of mutual 
cooperation was imminent for the first time since World War 
II. These global events marked the beginning of new 
challenges for the United States. Consequently, in response 
to these global changes and emerging democratic forces, the 
U.S. increased its support to other nations through security- 
assistance programs, making the U.S. a leader in world arms 
exports. 
B.   SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
Security assistance is one of the primary methods that 
the U.S. uses to promote its foreign and national security 
policy. Department of Defense defines security assistance 
as: 
Group of programs authorized by the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 
related statutes by which the United States 
provides defense articles, military training, and 
other defense-related services, by grant, credit, 
or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies 
and objectives. [Ref. 37:p. 327] 
It is through security assistance, that the U.S. seeks 
to strengthen the national security of friendly nations, and 
to support existing democracies. It performs these functions 
through the group of programs stated above, which are all 
authorized by law. 
Within the purview of security assistance programs are 
seven major program components.   All foreign Government 
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procurement of defense equipment from the U.S. Government 
occurs through one of these program components. A brief 
description of these components is provided below [Ref. 
4:pp. 36-38] : 
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) And Foreign 
Military Construction Sales Program 
The FMS program allows eligible foreign countries to 
purchase defense articles, services, and training from the 
U.S. Government. Foreign Military Sales cases occur when 
the purchasing Government enters into a cost-type 
contractual Government-to-Government agreement. This 
agreement is documented by a LOA between the U.S. Government 
and the foreign Government, and is referred to as a "case." 
2. The Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP 
or FMF) 
Authorized under the provisions of Arms Export Control 
Act of 1976, this program consists of grants and loans 
offered by the U.S. to eligible countries. These countries 
are allowed to use this money to purchase U.S. defense 
articles, services, and training through either FMS or 
direct commercial sales. 
3. Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Licensed Under 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 
Under the DCS program, the foreign Government contracts 
directly with the U.S. contractor, whereby the U.S. 
Government is not responsible for any contractual 
considerations. These transactions are not managed by 
Department of Defense (DoD) and are not Government-to- 
Government agreements, as in the case of FMS agreements. 
li 
Rather, U.S. Government involvement occurs through licensing 
by the Office of Defense Trade Control in the Department of 
State, and is merely to provide Congressional oversight for 
the program. 
4. The International Military Education And 
Training (IMET) Program 
This program provides monetary support for the training 
of international personnel in the U.S. and U.S. facilities 
overseas. Since 1989, Congress has prohibited the use of 
IMET funds by countries whose annual per capita gross 
national product exceeds $2,349.00 million, unless the 
country will fund certain expenses for its students. 
5. Economic Support Fund (ESF) 
This program is designed to promote economic and 
political stability in countries that the U.S. has deemed 
vital to its national interests. Such countries either have 
special political and security interests important to the 
U.S., or need assistance to ensure peace, or economic and 
political harmony. 
6. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
Peacekeeping operations are authorized under the 
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, Part II, Chapter VI, 
as amended. Historically, these operations have included 
multinational peacekeeping forces and observers in Cyprus, 
Liberia, West African states, Soviet Union, Rwanda, Somalia, 
and Haiti. 
12 
7.   Nonproliferation And Disarmament Fund 
This program was implemented to discourage the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Current 
funding is designed to reduce the nuclear force of former 
Soviet Union states, and to promote security in other 
volatile regions of the world. 
C.   U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
The genesis for legal authority of security assistance 
programs lies in U.S. laws, which stipulate various 
restrictions, reporting requirements, authorization 
requirements, and appropriations. These public laws govern 
all ensuing actions of the three branches of the Federal 
Government. To further clarify this relationship, a brief 
discussion of the roles of each branch, with respect to 
security assistance, is addressed below. Figure 1 depicts 
the U.S. Government organization for security assistance 
[Ref. 4:p. 76]. 
1.   Executive Branch 
Of the three branches, the Executive Branch is the most 
heavily involved with security assistance programs. It is 
responsible for the execution of foreign policy laws, and 
ensures that all agreements under the seven programs of 
security assistance are successfully implemented. Executive 
Branch organizations relevant to this research are discussed 
below. 
a.   Office  Of The President  Of The  United States 
The U.S. Constitution gives responsibility to the 
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Source: The Manaapnifint of Security Assistance, DISAM, 1994 
Figure 1. United States Government Organization For 
Security Assistance 
14 
policy. As such, the President is empowered to enter into 
treaties, appoint U.S. ambassadors to foreign countries, and 
receive ambassadors from other nations. With respect to 
security assistance, one of the most vital duties of the 
President is that of proposing the annual U.S. assistance 
program and budget to Congress. Additionally, the President 
is responsible for providing oversight for all activities 
concerning security assistance programs. 
b.       Department Of State 
Primary agencies relevant to security assistance 
programs within the Department of State include the Bureau 
of Politico-Military Affairs, and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs 
is the principal liaison between the Department of State and 
Department of Defense. Within this agency are several 
offices that have a direct impact on the implementation of 
security assistance programs. For example, the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls has the responsibility both for 
licensing the exports of arms and material on the U.S. 
Munitions List, and for issuing the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations. The Office of Defense Relations and 
Security Assistance is responsible for the daily operation 
of security assistance programs, and coordinates directly 
with the Defense Security Assistance Agency in the 
Department of Defense. The Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency is responsible for preparing evaluations of how 
proposed weapons sales could affect the arms race, and for 
notifying Congress of FMS cases over $50 million. Although 
15 
this agency is technically separate from the Department of 
State, it receives guidance from this agency. 
c. Department of the Treasury 
Within the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. 
Customs Service is responsible for two major functions. 
These are: reviewing Munitions Control Export Licensing 
requests, and informing the Department of State of any 
irregularities in these requests. 
d. Department Of Commerce 
The Department of Commerce is concerned primarily 
with commodity control, and interfaces with the Departments 
of State and Defense. This department determines the defense 
items that should be placed on the Commodity Control List. 
Items placed on this list are subject to limitations or 
prohibitions concerning their export from the U.S., under 
any type of agreement with a foreign Government. 
e. Department Of Defense 
Within the DoD, the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency (DSAA) is vastly involved with security assistance 
programs. The DSAA is. responsible for directing, 
administrating, and supervising, the execution of all 
security assistance programs. Relevant functions within its 
purview include: conducting logistics and sales negotiations 
with foreign countries; receiving and seeking Congressional 
approval for Letters of Request (LOR) from customer 
countries; serving as the DoD point of contact for liaison 
with industry; and making determinations for the 
distribution of FMS administrative funds. The DSAA is also 
responsible   for   all   overseas   Security   Assistance 
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Organizations (SAO), although these organizations are not in 
the Department of Defense. Security Assistance 
Organizations manage most aspects of country security 
assistance programs to include fiscal, logistical, and 
contractual functions. With regard to Thailand, the SAO is 
called the Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group (JUSMAG); with 
regard to Kuwait, it is called the U.S. Liaison Office. 
f.       Department Of The Army 
(1) Department of the Army (DA) , Assistant 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. Within the Department 
of the Army (DA) , the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Logistics (DA DCSLOG), is responsible for providing 
oversight for the implementation of all Army related 
security assistance activities to include LOA development 
during the FMS process. Operational aspects of all security 
assistance activities are assigned to major subordinate 
commands that include the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC). 
The U.S. Army Material Command is responsible for providing 
oversight for administering, implementing, executing and 
managing Army related FMS cases. 
(2) U.S. Army Security Assistance Command. 
Subordinate to the U.S. Army Material Command is the U.S. 
Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). The U.S. Army 
Security Assistance Command is responsible for implementing 
all FMS activities. With respect to FMS cases, USASAC 
reviews all LOAs and forwards them to DSAA for approval. 
(3) U.S. Army Tank - Automotive Command 
(TACOM). The Tank - Automotive Command is directly 
responsible for managing all armored systems and automotive 
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equipment [Ref. 24] . Subordinate to the Tank - Automotive 
Command is the Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance 
Center (TSAC), which is responsible for the execution of all 
FMS transactions of armored and automotive systems that are 
currently in the DoD inventory, or are obsolete. Letters of 
Offer and Acceptance for services, or materials originate 
from the Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance 
Center. Also subordinate to the Tank and Automotive Command 
is the Program Executive Office (PEO), Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles (TWV). Currently, the PEO does not have a 
dedicated position responsible for international operations 
or FMS transactions. Consequently, the PM assumes personal 
responsibility for all FMS transactions pertaining to new 
production vehicles. Figure 2 depicts the U.S. Army 
organization for security assistance. Figure 3 depicts the 
PEO-TWV organization. 
2.   Legislative And Judicial Branches 
With respect to security assistance programs, both the 
Legislative and Judicial branches of the U.S. Government are 
actively involved. The Legislative Branch of the U.S. 
Government is responsible for the passage of security 
assistance laws, the appropriation of security assistance 
program funding, the Congressional approval for Government- 
to-Government agreements, and eligibility determination for 
participation in security assistance programs. The Judicial 
Branch is responsible for the interpretation of security 
assistance laws, and for the resolution of security 
assistance related contractual disputes. 
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Figure  2.   United States Army Organization  for Security- 
Assistance 
19 
Figure 3. PEO-TWV Organization 
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D.   CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
All security assistance programs are subject to two 
Federal Laws, which provide for the authorization and 
appropriation necessary to control and fund the component 
programs. With respect to funding, security assistance 
legislation does not provide appropriation authority for FMS 
or commercial exports, since appropriated funds are not 
involved in these transactions. 
1.   The Foreign Assistance Act 
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) was originally enacted 
on 4 September 1961, and gave purpose and direction to the 
foreign aid program. Congressional intent for the Foreign 
Assistance Act was to strengthen the security of the U.S. by 
assuring the security of other countries. This could be 
accomplished by providing military aid to foreign countries, 
as a deterrent against both internal and external 
aggression. Currently, however, the Foreign Assistance Act 
is the authorizing legislation for three security assistance 
programs: Peacekeeping Operations, the Economic Support 
Fund, and the International Military Education and Training 
program. 
With respect to FMS  however, the Foreign Assistance 
Act contains one restriction: 
The President shall continue to instruct U.S. 
diplomatic and military personnel in the U.S. 
mission abroad that they should not encourage, 
promote, or influence the purchase by any foreign 
country of U.S. made military equipment, unless 
they are specifically instructed to do so by an 
appropriate official of the Executive Branch. 
[Ref. 29:p. 3985] 
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2.   The Arms Export Control Act 
The Arms Export Control Act was originally passed as 
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968. This Act authorized 
the sale of defense articles and services by the U.S. 
Government to friendly foreign Governments. The Arms Export 
Control Act incorporates this original intent and now 
includes the governing, licensing and sale of defense items 
through direct commercial sales. 
E.   ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 
This section provides a general overview of the primary 
laws, regulations, directives, and policies which relate to 
ethics and standards of conduct for all personnel involved 
with security assistance. 
1.   Public Law 87-849 (18 U.S. Code) 
This  law specifies what  conflicts of  interest by 
Federal employees are subject to criminal penalties, from a 
breach  of  fiduciary  duty.  Fiduciary  refers  to  the 
responsibility  of  a  person  "...holding  a  special 
relationship of trust, confidence or duty to act primarily 
for another's benefit."  [Ref. 4:p. 459]   Fiduciary duty, 
then,  refers  to  the  responsibility  of  all  Government 
employees to place loyalty to country, ethical principles, 
and law, above private gain and other interests. Among those 
conflicts of interest subject to penalties are: [Ref. 4:p. 
460] 
• Bribery - The dishonest giving or offering of 
anything of value to a public official with the 
intent to influence or commit fraud. 
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Graft - The use of one's position to gain 
something of value at the expense of another 
party (extortion). 
2.   Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), DoD 5500.7-R 
This regulation is a single source on standards of 
ethical conduct and ethics guidance for all DoD personnel. 
With respect to this thesis topic, some of the major 
activities addressed by this regulation include the 
following: [Ref. 40:p. 1] 
• Ethical Conduct. 
• Official and personnel participation in non- 
Federal activities. 
• Travel Benefits. 
• Conflicts of Interest. 
• Political Activities. 
Additionally, the JER also incorporated DoD Directive 
(DoDD) 5500.7, Standards of Conduct, which addressed the 
attendance or participation of DoD personnel in social 
gathering that are hosted by foreign Governments. Although 
these incorporations were performed, and DoDD 5500.7 was 
canceled, the JER does not specifically address any actions 
by Government employees pertaining to foreign Governments. 
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3.   DoD Office Of The Inspector General Guidelines 
a. Defense  Ethics,   A  Standards   Of  Conduct   Guide 
For DoD Employees 
This guide addresses questions and answers on 
ethical conduct primarily on: soliciting, gifts, policy, and 
bribery. [Ref. 38: p. iii] 
b. Indicators Of Fraud In DoD Procurement 
This document stipulates indicators of fraud to 
include the following: [Ref. 3 9:p. 1] 
Crimes involved in contract fraud. 





Progress payment fraud. 
Fast pay fraud. 
Bribery. 
Gratuities and conflicts of interest. 
Commercial bribery and kickbacks. 
Civil, contractual, and administrative remedies 
for fraud. 
Voluntary disclosure of fraud. 
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F.   SUMMARY 
During the last decade, the geopolitical climate 
of the world has continually changed, giving rise to an 
increase in security assistance support from the United 
States. Through security assistance programs, the U.S. 
continues to promote both foreign and national security 
policies. It performs these functions through seven 
major program components: FMS and the Foreign Military 
Construction Sales program, the Foreign Military 
Financing program, the Direct Commercial Sales licensed 
under the Arms Export Control Act program, the 
International Military Education and Training program, 
the Economic Support Fund, Peacekeeping Operations, and 
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. 
Organizations responsible for the implementation 
of these components include those from the Executive, 
Legislative and Judicial branches of the U.S. 
Government. These organizations implement these 
components through authorizations, appropriations and 
policies. With respect to the current U.S. security 
assistance program, two basic laws are involved: The 
Foreign Assistance Act is the authorizing legislation 
for IMET, ESF, PKO; while the Arms Export Control Act 
is the statutory basis for the conduct of FMS funding 
for FMF and the control of commercial sales of defense 
articles and services. Both laws specify conditions of 
eligibility for which countries must fulfill to qualify 
for security assistance program aid. Other laws 
applicable to the security assistance program include 
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those pertaining to ethics. Public Law 87-849 
stipulates those actions which constitute conflicts of 
interest for Federal employees. Despite these 
stipulations on security assistance actions, however, 
the security assistance program continues to increase, 
making the U.S. a leader in world arms exports. 
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III. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: DESCRIPTION 
OF THE THAILAND AND KUWAIT CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the policy and process involved in 
the FMS of new production vehicles, and describes the 
Thailand and Kuwait FMS cases. Specifically, it focuses on 
the FMS policies impacting tactical wheeled vehicles. The 
FMS process for new production vehicles is structured and 
evaluated by LOA phases. This chapter concludes by 
presenting the significant aspects of the FMTV FMS cases to 
Thailand and Kuwait. 
B. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM 
1.   Background 
As one of the seven components under security 
assistance, FMS allows for the sale of defense equipment to 
foreign Governments. It is a nonappropriated program through 
which ..."the President may...enter into contracts for the 
procurement of defense articles or defense services for sale 
for U.S. dollars to any foreign country." [Ref. 4:p. 252] 
One of the limitations with this program component, however, 
is the restriction that the U.S. Government cannot make or 
lose money during a FMS transaction. Thus, the customer 
country must pay all costs that may be associated with the 
sale. 
Foreign Military Sales has become an increasingly 
important part of the U.S. security assistance program, as 
DoD continues to drawdown its force structure.  During the 
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period Fiscal Year (FY) 1991-1993, the Tank - Automotive 
Command continued to be a significant player in the FMS 
program. During this period, the Tank - Automotive Command 
Security Assistance Center generated 7.4 billion dollars 
worth of automotive and armored systems sales worldwide, 41% 
of the U.S. Army Material Command's entire FMS business. Of 
this amount, truck sales to foreign Governments totaled over 
1.2 billion dollars, equating to the sale of over 14,000 
tactical wheeled vehicles to 16 different countries. Among 
these statistics, 82% of all new vehicles produced in 1994 
were procured for foreign Governments. [Ref. 24] These 
acquisitions by foreign countries occurred through the FMS 
process. 
2.   Legislation 
Legislation governing FMS includes provisions from the 
Foreign Assistance and Arms Export Control Acts. Pertinent 
FMS stipulations from these laws relevant to this research 
are as follows: 
a. Conditions Of Eligibility For FMS 
All foreign Governments are subject to conditions 
of eligibility before an FMS agreement can occur. These 
include: defense articles may not be sold to foreign 
Governments, unless the action improves the security posture 
of the U.S. Government; the customer country must be 
approved by Congressional action; and upon procurement, the 
customer country must agree to not transfer title of the 
purchased equipment to a third party. [Ref. 28:p. 725] 
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Jb.   Overseas Management  Of Assistance And Sales 
Programs 
The President can assign any member of the Armed 
Forces to an overseas Security Assistance Organization for 
the purposes of equipment and services case management, and 
training management. Personnel in these positions are 
responsible for the following activities: [Ref. 4:p. 102] 
• Monitoring the host country's equipment 
capabilities. 
• Providing assessments of the equipment in terms 
of the host country's needs. 
• Providing all U.S. equipment information 
requested by the host country. 
• Ensuring that the FMS agreement is implemented 
in accordance with the desires of the host 
country. 
c.        Procurement Sales 
The U.S. Government may procure defense items for 
the customer country, if the country agrees to repay the 
full amount of the purchase cost. Such transactions are 
reimbursed through an FMS agreement between the recipient 
country and the U.S. Government. 
3. FMS Policies Impacting Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
In addition to the Federal Laws that govern security 
assistance, policies that impact the FMS program include 
those from the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense. 
Before these policies can be applied however, a 
determination must be made concerning which agency of the 
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Federal Government has jurisdiction over the exporting of 
the vehicles [Ref. 7:p. 1] . Although guidance by the 
Department of State specifies that an Export License under 
the International Traffic in Arms Regulation is not 
required, ambiguities still exist. For example, this 
guidance also suggests that a determination must be made to 
ascertain whether the vehicle is on the Munitions List [Ref. 
15:p. 3]. 
a.   Department Of State 
(1) Title 22 U.S. Code of Federal Regulation 
120.5, Foreign Relations and Intercourse. This policy states 
that the office of Munitions Control must determine whether 
a defense article is on the Munitions List. If a doubt 
exists within the U.S. Government concerning whether an 
article is on the Munitions List, a Commodity Jurisdiction 
procedure must result. This procedure entails consultations 
among the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense. [Ref. 
42:p. 345] 
Additionally, this code specifies that the 
Military Articles and Services List must also be checked. 
This list is published quarterly and updated weekly, and is 
distributed to the agencies which prepare Letters of Offer 
and Acceptance. It provides a listing of the military 
articles and services that can be offered under Foreign 
Military Sales. Since it is DoD policy that equipment sold 
through FMS reflect favorably upon the U.S., this list 
specifies those vehicles that meet established sale 
criteria.  Vehicles sold through FMS will normally be new or 
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unused,  or,  as a minimum,  have serviceability standards 
prescribed for issue to the U.S. forces. 
(2) International Traffic In Arms Regulation 
amendment, Munitions List. An amendment to the 
International Traffic In Arms Regulation delineates those 
military vehicles that are on the Munitions List and 
therefore are under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
State for export control.  These vehicles are: 
Category VII - Tanks and Military Vehicles 
...(d) Military trucks, trailers, hoists, and 
skids specifically designed, modified, or equipped 
to mount or carry weapons of Categories I, II, and 
IV or for carrying and handling the articles in 
paragraph (a) of Categories III and IV. [Ref. 
41:p. 39288] 
b.       Department  Of Commerce 
Regulations from the Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Export Administration, further clarifies ambiguity 
in identifying those vehicles considered on the Munitions 
List. Generally, those vehicles not on the Munitions List 
are considered non-combat military vehicles and are licensed 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
(1) Supplement No. 1 to Title 15 U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulation 799.2 at Interpretation 19. This code 
states that for purposes of U.S. export controls, military 
automotive vehicles 'possessing or built to current military 
specifications differing materially from normal commercial 
specifications' may include, but are not limited to, the 
following characteristics: [Ref. 35:p. 658] 
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• Special  fittings  for  mounting  ordnance  or 
military equipment. 
• Bullet-proof glass. 
• Armor plating. 
• Fungus preventive treatment. 
• Twenty-four volt electrical systems. 
• Shielded electrical system(electronic emissions 
suppression). 
• Puncture-proof or run-flat tires. 
The code further states that these military 
automotive vehicles fall into two broad categories: 
military automotive vehicles on the Munitions List, new and 
used; and military automotive vehicles not on the U.S. 
Munitions List, new and used. Military automotive vehicles 
on the Munitions List are primarily combat (fighting) 
vehicles, with or without armor and/or armament, designed 
for specific fighting functions. These automotive vehicles 
are licensed by the U.S. Department of State. Military 
vehicles not on the Munitions List are primarily transport 
vehicles designed for non-combat military purposes. These 
purposes include: transporting cargo, personnel and/or 
equipment; and towing other vehicles and equipment over land 
and roads in close support of fighting vehicles and troops. 
These automotive vehicles are licensed by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. 
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(2) International Traffic In Arms Regulation 
at Title 22 U.S. Code of Federal Regulation 123.4. In cases 
where trucks are used for demonstration purposes and not a 
permanent export, a Temporary License is needed. For a 
vehicle on the Munitions List, a Temporary Export License is 
authorized under Title 22. [Ref. 41:p. 725] (For a vehicle 
on the Commodity List, temporary licenses are authorized 
under Title 15 U.S. Code of Federal Regulation 771.22) 
c.   Department  Of Defense Policies 
The DoD Security Assistance Management Manual 
(SAMM) 5105.38-M, establishes the DoD policies relevant to 
Foreign Military Sales. This manual states that FMS of U.S. 
defense equipment to foreign Governments should only be 
approved when they are consistent with U.S. foreign policy 
interests. Additionally, marketing of defense products 
should be left to U.S. defense industries, unless 
specifically approved in advance by the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA). 
Department of Defense manual 5105.38-M, Section 
601 establishes the policies regarding contractor preference 
for direct commercial sales. Direct commercial sales 
preference recognizes the contractor's desire to sell 
directly to countries that are approved to receive defense 
articles and services granted by statute, as opposed to a 
Government-to-Government agreement through Foreign Military 
Sales. This preference is implemented by the U.S. 
Government as a courtesy to industry as a method of 
promoting the industrial base. [Ref. 36:p. 601-1] 
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Department of Defense manual 5105.38-M, Section 
602 sets forth the policy and the commercial industries 
relationship with the in-country Security Assistance 
Officer. The in-country Security Assistance Officer is the 
central point of contact for commercial industries 
interested in marketing any defense equipment. Additionally, 
in conjunction with Security Assistance Organization 
responsibilities, the Security Assistance Officer is 
responsible for assisting in the flow of information to 
potential customer countries. This action is a courtesy to 
the host Government to help them determine whether to 
purchase vehicles through direct commercial sales or through 
Foreign Military Sales. [Ref. 36:p. 602-1] 
d.       Department       Of       The       Army      Policies       And 
Regulations 
(1) Army Acquisition Executive Policy 
Memorandum, dated 1 December 1993: Subject: Marketing of 
U.S. Defense Equipment. This memorandum specifies the 
following instructions for in-country Security Assistance 
Officers: [Ref. 11:p. 1] 
• Support marketing efforts of U.S. Companies. 
• Provide country information (budget, decision 
making process, equipment needs, indigenous 
defense products). 
• Assist with scheduling appointments for U.S. 
Government and industry officials. 
• Remain neutral between U.S. competitors (do not 
promote any single U.S. company). 
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(2) Army Acquisition Executive Policy- 
Memorandum #90-7, dated 30 November 1990: Subject: Security- 
Assistance. This policy promulgates the Department of the 
Army position on security assistance with respect to Foreign 
Military Sales. It emphasizes the Army's commitment to the 
security assistance program and encourages PMs to integrate 
security assistance activities with DoD requirements in 
their respective programs. Additionally, this policy 
promotes support of FMS cases, and states that although 
marketing should be left to contractors, the PM should 
facilitate sales when possible. 
An addendum to this policy further clarifies 
the role of the PM with respect to certain agencies. The 
policy stipulates that the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) 
is the Department of the Army executive agent for approved 
security assistance programs. This role is performed through 
the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), and the 
major subordinate commands. Responsibilities of the PM with 
respect to security assistance and these agencies are as 
follows:  [Ref. 10: p.l] 
• Participate in the development and execution of 
Security assistance agreements. 
• Provide advice, assistance, and recommendations 
to the U.S. Army Material Command for the 
weapon systems. 
• Consider the possibility for development of an 
export model of the weapon systems. 
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• When it will enhance national security- 
interests, provide the materials to demonstrate 
the weapon systems to assist in either the 
coproduction or sale of the item. This is 
accomplished in conjunction with the U.S. Army 
Material Command (AMC). 
• Ensure that a continuing flow of information 
occurs between AMC, and the major subordinate 
command security assistance activity, to U.S. 
Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) on 
projects having relevance to security 
assistance programs. 
(3) Army Acquisition Executive Policy 
Memorandum #91-4, dated 28 February 1991: Subject: Matrix 
Support Policy for Program Executive Officer (PEO) Managed 
Systems. This policy stipulates the Department of the Army 
position on FMS funding. It specifies that all FMS work 
should be resourced by FMS dollars through the major 
subordinate command matrix support. With respect to the PM, 
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, this translates into the Tank - 
Automotive Command matrix support agencies supporting all 
FMS work. Further, if the PM must perform FMS work, then any 
Memorandum of Understanding governing the agreement between 
the Tank - Automotive Command and the PM must include 
provisions for reimbursement from the applicable FMS 
accounts [Ref. 9:p. 1]. 
(4) The U.S. Army Security Assistance 
Command Memorandum, dated 14 May 1992, Subject: Security 
Assistance Support for FMS Cases Involving Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles. This document presents policy for both the PM and 
the security assistance activity at the Tank - Automotive 
36 
Command. A synopsis of these policies is provided below: 
[Ref. 14: p.l] 
• PMs should be integrated with security 
assistance, due to their technical knowledge of 
their systems, but with parameters limiting 
their authority. 
• Security assistance representatives should be 
included in all discussions with foreign 
representatives, and will determine if the PM 
needs to be present. 
• U.S. Army Security Assistance Command should be 
the provider of all information to the 
customer, and the responder to all requests. 
(5) U.S. Army Regulation, 12-8, dated 21 
December 1990, Subject: Security Assistance Operations and 
Procedures. This regulation specifies policies and 
prescribes procedures for the sale of items of equipment and 
services to friendly foreign nations. With respect to the 
Thailand FMS case, this regulation also specifically states 
that . . . "the Government of Thailand has been granted an 
exception to purchase articles and services identified as 
available through direct commercial sales, through FMS." 
[Ref. 8:p.31] (Kuwait became more involved in FMS after 
1991. Consequently, this regulation does not address 
Kuwait, due to its publication date of 1990.) 
e.        Tank   - Automotive  Command Security Assistance 
Center Policies 
The  Tank  -  Automotive  Command  Security 
Assistance Center has a Business Plan,  which gives 
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general guidance for the implementation of FMS cases. 
Their mission is to augment the warm production of the 
U.S. defense industrial base, through the sale of 
automotive and armament equipment to U.S. friends and 
allies'. Policies include: creating the opportunity to 
send business to U.S. manufacturing sources; and, 
supporting vehicle fleets already sold to customer 
countries, by helping contractors use the FMS process 
to find markets for their products and services which 
support equipment already sold. [Ref. 16:p. 2] 
Additionally, the Business Plan Annex 
addresses the responsibilities of the Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center for Foreign Military 
Sales. These responsibilities include the following: 
• 
• 
Develop all LOA information to include: 
- Price and Availability information. 
- Congressional notifications. 
- Support concepts, and sustainment 
packages. 
Provide all planning information during the 
implementation of the LOA to include: 
- Cost summaries. 
- Delivery schedules. 
• Manage active, new production FMS cases for 
vehicles to include these actions: 
- Request obligation of funds. 
- Make program changes by requesting 
modifications to the contract, if needed. 
- Requisition concurrent spare parts. 
• Ensure material is supplied and services are 
completed during LOA execution to include: 
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- Delivery of vehicles to the recipient 
country. 
- Providing for quality assurance inspections 
of delivered vehicles. 
- Assisting customers on technical matters. 
4.   Types Of Vehicle FMS Cases 
There are several types of FMS cases used for the 
purchase of tactical wheeled vehicles. These FMS cases are 
usually categorized into one of three distinct types: 
Defined Order, Blanket Order, and Cooperative Logistics 
Supply Support Arrangement [Ref. 4:p. 187]. Many FMS 
agreements are Defined Order cases, specifically delineating 
the quantities and types of vehicles, as stated in both the 
LOR and the Letter of Agreement. (Department of the Army 
refers to this type as a Standard Sales case.) The second 
type of agreement is a Blanket Order case, which is an 
agreement between the customer country and the U.S. 
Government for a category of vehicles, but with no 
definitive quantity specified. With this type of case, a 
monetary ceiling is established and the customer continues 
to purchase vehicles as long as funds are available. This 
case is also used to purchase spare and repair parts, 
technical services, support equipment, and training. The 
third type of FMS case is the Cooperative Logistics Supply 
Support Arrangement (CLSSA). This is a military logistics 
support arrangement for follow-on sustainment support for 
the vehicles procured. 
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5.   Methods For Fulfilling Vehicle FMS Cases 
In general, there are two methods by which the U.S. 
Government may fulfill an FMS agreement for vehicles. The 
primary method is to sell vehicles presently in the DoD 
inventory. The second method is through the purchase of new 
production vehicles. Which method is used however, will 
depend upon the terms of the FMS agreement between the U.S. 
Government and the recipient country. 
a.   Sale From  the DoD Inventory 
The primary method of fulfilling an FMS vehicle 
agreement occurs through the sale of trucks from the current 
DoD tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. If the customer country 
desires to purchase vehicles that are presently in the fleet 
inventory, the Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance 
Center assigns a country manager to oversee this case. This 
manager receives information from the PM regarding all 
aspects of the vehicles capabilities, and characteristics, 
as well as recommendations for vehicle support and 
sustainment requirements. 
Jb.   Sale Of New Production Vehicles 
The second method of fulfilling an FMS vehicle 
agreement occurs through the sale of new production 
vehicles, which are already under contract by the U.S. 
Government. If the foreign Government desires to purchase 
new production vehicles, such as the FMTVs, the Tank - 
Automotive Command Security Assistance Center assigns a 
country manager. Because of previous methods for handling 
equipment already in the DoD inventory, this country manager 
has the responsibility to manage and provide immediate 
40 
oversight  for  all  of  the  transactions  and  activities 
occurring during the FMS process for new equipment. 
In general, the U.S. Government procures the new 
equipment from the U.S. producer, and then resells the 
equipment on a cash or credit basis to the foreign 
Government through an FMS agreement [Ref. 24]. The security- 
assistance community is responsible for determining how the 
FMS agreement will be fulfilled. For example, the original 
production plan can be altered, whereby the recipient 
country would receive vehicles originally slated for the 
U.S. Government. If this course of action is selected, 
however, permission must be obtained from the Department of 
the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DA DCSOPS). 
Regardless of how the requirement is fulfilled however, 
accomplishment of the FMS case will result in a production 
quantity change in the contract between the U.S. Government 
and the contractor. 
6.   FMS Administrative Fees For New Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles 
The Arms Export Control Act requires the U.S. 
Government to recover all costs applicable to the FMS 
agreement, on a non-profit basis. Generally, in the case of 
a new procurement, this includes the full amount of the FMS 
agreement, plus appropriate charges for the following: 
administrative services, nonrecurring costs of research, 
development and production for the vehicles, and ordinary 
inventory losses. [Ref. 4:p. 273] 
With respect  to the FMS of new tactical wheeled 
vehicles, the Tank-Automotive Command Security Assistance 
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Center currently receives the administrative fees, because 
they are the designated lead agency for FMS actions. The 
Tank-Automotive Command Security Assistance Center supports 
all FMS activities and related personnel pay with the 3% 
administrative fee that is applied to every FMS agreement. 
Under existing policies, the PMO does not receive any direct 
FMS funding to support FMS activities. 
C.   FMS PROCESS FOR NEW TACTICAL WHEELED VEHICLES 
To acquire new vehicles from the U.S. Government, many 
activities are necessary to ensure the successful completion 
of the FMS process. This section presents a brief 
description of the current new tactical wheeled vehicle FMS 
process, and identifies the primary activities that occur in 
each of the four phases of the process. These phases are: 
Pre-LOA, LOA Development, LOA Implementation, and LOA 
Execution (see Figure 4). 
1.   Pre-LOA Phase 
With respect to new tactical vehicles, the FMS process 
begins with a vehicle requirements determination by the 
foreign Government. The customer country identifies a 
truck type as a result of vehicle demonstrations, or 
solicits information from the security assistance community. 
Once the customer identifies a particular type of vehicle 
for purchase, the country sends a Letter of Request. This 
Letter of Request (LOR) signifies the customer country's 
intent to proceed with an FMS case, and precedes the 
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Figure 4. New Tactical Wheeled Vehicle FMS Process 
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submitted through the U.S. Embassy, and should be addressed 
to the Department of the Army, with information copies sent 
to the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The LOR must 
state whether it is a request for Price and Availability 
data, which is a very rough estimate of the cost and 
availability of the vehicles, or whether it is a formal 
request for a Letter of Offer and Acceptance. Before any 
further action is taken on the LOR, however, it must be 
reviewed. The review validates that the potential customer 
is eligible for the FMS; that the vehicles or services 
sought may be sold; and that the request was received 
through proper channels. To determine eligibility of the 
customer, the DSAA reviews Congressional data and convenes a 
Security Assistance Review conference with the requesting 
Government. 
To determine whether the vehicles requested can also be 
sold, the DSAA checks the requested vehicles against the 
Munitions List and the Military Articles and Services List. 
If the customer country desires new vehicles exclusively, 
this requirement is specified in the LOR and set forth in 
the Letter of Offer and Acceptance. 
Upon review of the LOR, the U.S. Government then 
decides to act on the request. If the U.S. decides to act 
favorably on the request, the request will be forwarded to 
the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and then on to 
the Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance Center. If 
the U.S. Government decides against acting on the request, 
a negative response  is then sent to the foreign Government. 
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2. LOA Development 
The LOA represents a bona fide offer by the U.S. 
Government to sell the described vehicles through an FMS 
agreement. The development and preparation of the LOA is 
the responsibility of the Tank - Automotive Command Security 
Assistance Center. Once the LOR is received by the Tank - 
Automotive Command Security Assistance Center, all 
documentation relating to the formulation of the FMS 
agreement is prepared. The LOA is assigned a country manager 
to oversee the case, and a number that identifies the 
specific vehicles requested from the Letter of Request. This 
number is unique, identifies each LOA for accounting 
purposes, and establishes the LOA as an FMS case. 
Subsequent to the Tank - Automotive Command Security 
Assistance Center's processing of all the information to 
complete the LOA, it is sent forward for approval. The LOA 
is transmitted to the DSAA, through the U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command. From the DSAA, it is sent to the 
Department of State. The Department of State notifies 
Congress of the pending Letter of Offer and Acceptance. If 
Congress does not block the sale, the LOA is sent to the 
foreign Government for acceptance and signature. [Ref. 19] 
3. LOA Implementation 
The LOA becomes an FMS agreement, ready for 
implementation, when it is formally accepted by a 
representative of the purchasing nation. The customer 
country only has 60 days to accept and sign the LOA, and 
forward it with the required initial payment. All cases not 
received within ten days of the expiration date on the LOA 
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are canceled.  If the purchaser knows that they cannot meet 
the expiration date, they must request an extension. 
4.   LOA Execution 
After the signed LOA and initial deposit are received, 
the LOA is executed. The process for execution begins when 
the Defense Finance and Accounting Service releases the 
obligation authority to the Department of the Army to allow 
for the requisitioning of funds. Obligation authority is 
evidence that proper case acceptance, including the cash 
deposit from the purchasing country, has been received, and 
that the case may be implemented. The Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center country manager for the 
FMS case then initiates the purchase request to the 
appropriate contracting officer to execute the FMS case. For 
new production vehicles, the PM must be immediately notified 
of the impending LOA execution. The LOA Execution phase 
concludes with the actual production performed, and the 
delivery of the vehicles to the recipient Government. 
D.   THAILAND AND KUWAIT FMS CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
1.   Background 
Since Desert Storm, allies such as Thailand and Kuwait 
have sought to improve their defensive posture by developing 
strategic modernization plans that have included the 
modernizing of their Army equipment. As part of these 
modernization plans, both countries have negotiated with 
the U.S. for procurement of new vehicles belonging to the 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. These trucks are 
essential to the modernization program of both countries, 
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since  their  current  fleets  are  comprised  of  either 
antiquated or outmoded transportation assets. 
The FMTVs are a new weapon systems program, 
constituting a new family of vehicles that are the next 
generation of 2.5 - 5 ton medium trucks for the U.S. Army 
(see Figure 5) . The total estimated U.S. acquisition cost 
for this program is $17.2 billion, with a unit price for 
each truck of approximately $91,000. In October 1991, the 
Army awarded a 5-year, Firm-Fixed-Price with Economic Price 
Adjustment contract, to Stewart & Stevenson Services (S&S), 
Sealy, Texas. This contract is the first of six such multi- 
year contracts, planned for the production of 10,843 FMTVs. 
[Ref. 23] The U.S. Government has a 100% option to the 
original production contract. Initial low-rate production 
deliveries to the Army began on May 27, 1993, with fielding 
scheduled for December, 1995.   [Ref. 5:p. 1] 
The FMTVs were developed in response to the Army's need 
for greater endurance and performance. These vehicles have a 
high reliability rate, and innovative features, combining 
advanced European design with the unmatched performance and 
reliability of U.S. drive train and systems technology [Ref. 
19] . This vehicle system offers both a 2.5 ton and 5 ton 
version truck with several different configurations. Both 
the 2.5 and the 5 ton family of vehicles share the same 
chassis, and have a 90% parts commonality among all variants 
of the family. Innovative features of the FMTVs include: 
fully automatic, full-time all-wheel drive; Central Tire 
Inflation System - allows for in-cab inflating and deflating 
of  tires;  interior storage compartment  for gears;  cab 
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Figure 5.  Family of Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 
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tilt  forward for maintenance ease,  and maneuverability 
across hills with 30% slope gradients [Ref. 20]. 
Due to the family concept of these vehicles, reduced 
overall acquisition and life cycle costs are significant 
benefits. Reduced acquisition costs are the result of 
decreased component parts; and decreased logistical support 
costs related to training, manuals, and spare parts. 
Additionally, decreased overall life cycle costs are a 
result of better fuel economy, reliability, and improved 
warranties. These benefits have made the FMTVs attractive 
vehicle procurements for both Thailand and Kuwait [Ref. 
32:p.l]. Consequently, both countries have sought to procure 
these vehicles through the FMS process. 
2.   Thailand FMS Case Description 
a.   Pre-LOA Phase 
The sale of the FMTVs to Thailand began with a 
vehicle requirements study that occurred in 1993. The 
determination for vehicle requirements was based on vehicle 
demonstrations conducted by the FMTV contractor (S&S), and 
the PMO, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. These 
demonstrations occurred at the 1993 International Defense 
Exhibition in Abu Dhabi [Ref. 12:p.l]. 
Subsequent to this exhibition, Thailand sent a LOR 
to the U.S. Government requesting further information on the 
Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. This LOR was sent by 
the Thailand Government to the Joint U.S. Military Advisor 
Group - Thailand requesting the price and availability of 
the vehicles. The Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group - 
Thailand sent the LOR to the U.S. Army Security Assistance 
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Command. Subsequent to this action, the U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command contacted the Tank - Automotive Command 
Security Assistance Center, who in turn contacted the 
Project Management Office. 
Following this initial dialog between Thailand and 
the U.S., the PMO sent a letter to the Commander, Thailand 
Supply and Transportation Command acknowledging Thailand's 
interest in the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. This 
letter reiterated the U.S. commitment to this family of 
vehicles. It also informed the Thailand commander that 
initial testing of the FMTVs had begun at Aberdeen Proving 
Ground, Yuma Proving Ground, and Fort Bragg. 
After continuing dialog between the PM and the 
Thailand commander, the Tank - Automotive Command Security 
Assistance Command then requested a security assistance 
review conference. This request was sent to the U.S. Army 
Security Assistance Command, and then to the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency to determine Thailand's 
eligibility to procure vehicles from the United States. 
Ensuing communication between the U.S. and the Thailand 
Government ultimately resulted in a security assistance 
review conference held in Bangkok, Thailand. This 
conference was actually a negotiation forum where facts and 
information relevant to the FMS of the vehicles were 
exchanged and negotiated. Participants of this negotiation 
forum included representatives from the Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center, the U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command, the PMO, and representatives from the 
Thailand  military  and  Government.  Discussions  at  this 
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conference included a complete financial review for FMS 
funding, payment concerns, cash management, case 
implementation, case closure, and supply issues. [Ref. 13: 
p.2] 
Subsequent to this security assistance review, the 
Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group (JUSMAG) - Thailand sent a 
request on behalf of the Thailand Government for the Price 
and Availability data for vehicles belonging to the Family 
of Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. After numerous further 
conversations among the security assistance community, the 
PMO and Thailand, an LOA for Thailand was drafted. 
b. LOA Development 
An LOA for Thailand was actually developed by the 
PMO and prepared by the Tank - Automotive Command Security 
assistance Center. Details comprising the LOA were compiled 
by several activities in the PMO, and were submitted to the 
Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance Center for the 
preparation of the LOA document. An FMS agreement consisting 
of the LOA was negotiated with input by the PMO, the 
security assistance community and Thailand. The resulting 
FMS agreement occurred as a cost-reimbursement contract 
between Thailand and the United States [Ref. 22] . The 
negotiated agreement resulted in the Thailand Government 
procuring a small quantity of FMTVs previously slated for 
the U.S. Government. 
c. LOA Implementation 
Since the U.S. already had a contract negotiated 
with S&S for the production of the FMTVs, PMO negotiations 
resulted in a modification to the existing contract between 
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the U.S. Government, and Stewart and Stevenson. This 
modification to the original contract replaced the quantity 
of vehicles sold to the Government of Thailand through the 
FMS agreement. Thus, negotiations resulted in Thailand 
purchasing 70 M1088 5 ton tractor trucks. This agreement 
also included: support equipment, concurrent spare parts, 
quality assurance team support and equipment publications. 
The FMS agreement was a fourteen page document 
that consisted of five pages for the signed contract with 
another nine pages of general provisions, clauses, terms and 
conditions. The basic contract stipulated an agreement 
between the two countries on the estimated cost of the 
vehicles, and the description and quantity of items 
contracted. The ten page attachments of general provisions 
included agreements on the following issues: availability of 
contracted items, components of testing equipment, 
transportation arrangements, concurrent spare parts, follow- 
on support requirements, supportability, and quality 
assurance team issues. One clause inherent in the FMS 
agreement, the Tax Exempt Clause, addressed the fact that 
the articles and services purchased were tax exempt. [Ref. 
6:pp. 1-14] 
d.   LOA Execution 
Upon contract modification with S&S, the LOA was 
executed by the Project Management Office. Execution of the 
LOA allowed for the manufacturing and eventual future 
delivery of the vehicles required by the FMS agreement. 
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3.   Kuwait FMS Case Description 
a.   Pre-LOA Phase 
The sale of the FMTVs to Kuwait also began with a 
proposed vehicle requirements study that occurred in 1993. 
This study for vehicle requirements was based on vehicle 
demonstrations performed by S&S, which occurred at the 1993 
International Defense Exhibition in Abu Dhabi. Kuwaiti 
officials observed vehicles belonging to the FMTVs at this 
exhibition, and subsequently requested a more private 
demonstration of the vehicles at Kuwait. Representatives 
from several nations, as well as, their comparable FMTVs, 
were also invited to attend the demonstration in Kuwait. 
After evaluating two days of intense truck trials 
in the Kuwaiti desert, Kuwait sent a LOR to the U.S. 
Government requesting further information on the Family of 
Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. This LOR was sent by the 
Kuwaiti Government to the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, and 
requested information on vehicle characteristics and 
capabilities. The embassy passed the LOR to the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency, who in turn passed it through 
the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, to the Tank - 
Automotive Command Security Assistance Center. Finally, the 
PMO was contacted to actually provide the information on the 
vehicles. Following this inquiry, the PMO was proactive in 
maintaining an open dialog among the Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center, S&S, and Kuwaiti 
officials, regarding possible vehicle procurement for 
Kuwait. 
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Jb.   LOA Development 
Although Kuwait sent an LOR, the LOA has yet to be 
finalized. A proposed LOA was developed in accordance with 
information supplied by the PMO, and prepared by the Tank - 
Automotive Command Security Assistance Center. However, 
Kuwait decided to indefinitely postpone LOA negotiations, 
due to financial constraints. [Ref. 25] 
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IV.  ANALYSIS: THAILAND AND KUWAIT FMS CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an analyzes of the Thailand and 
Kuwait FMS cases. Cases are compared and contrasted with 
respect to five different perspectives: 1) comparative 
analysis of the PMO's actions in the LOA phases, 2) 
functional analysis of the security assistance agencies 
involved in the FMS process, 3) functional management role 
analysis of the PM, 4) ethical considerations concerning FMS 
and the PM, and, 5) the impact of FMS on the industrial 
base. 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: PMO ACTIONS IN LOA PHASES 
This section presents a comparative analysis of both 
FMS cases and examines similarities and differences in the 
actions of the PMO during the various LOA phases of the FMS 
process. The analysis of the PMO actions during the LOA 
phases will assist in determining the functional management 
roles of the PM during the FMS process. 
1.   Similarities 
a.   Pre-LOA Phase 
(1) Requirements Determination. Analysis 
with respect to the PMO, FMTVs reveals that in both FMS 
cases, pre-LOA discussions were frequently integrated with 
vehicle demonstrations to assist the customer country in 
requirements determination. In today's worldwide market, 
foreign Governments often use truck competitions and tests 
to compare vehicle capabilities to assist them in selecting 
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tactical wheeled vehicles for future procurement. In fact, 
many customer countries insist on vehicle demonstrations and 
comparative testing, and they specifically seek the opinions 
of the PMO, with respect to the demonstrated vehicle [Ref. 
19]. The first-hand knowledge of the PMO is thus critical in 
demonstrating the capabilities of the trucks to their 
fullest potential. Consequently, the importance of the PM's 
involvement in the FMS process, particularly with regard to 
vehicle demonstrations and pre-LOA discussions cannot be 
overemphasized. 
The initial pre-procurement negotiations 
between the U.S. and Thailand and Kuwait actually began 
with demonstrations of the vehicle. For example, preliminary 
demonstrations of the FMTVs by the PMO began during the 1993 
International Defense Exhibition in Abu Dhabi. Defense 
vendors from around the world were represented at this 
International Defense Exhibition, displaying both tactical 
vehicles (trucks) and combat vehicles (tanks). Although the 
event was not officially sponsored by DoD, the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency allowed military representatives 
from the PMO to attend. Consequently, military 
representatives attended in support of the U.S. firms that 
interacted with the PMO, and learned of potential 
competitors in the world market. United States vendors were 
among many exhibitors including those from Germany, France, 
Russia, Great Britain, and South Africa. During this 
exhibition, the PMO assisted in the demonstrations of the 
vehicle, and later conducted more extensive demonstrations 
in  Thailand  and  Kuwait.    Subsequent  to  these  truck 
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demonstrations, both countries sought additional information 
from the PMO and began pre-LOA discussions. Thus, in each 
FMS case, truck demonstrations were vital to the sale of the 
vehicles. 
(2) Pre-LOA Negotiations. During pre-LOA 
discussions in both FMS cases, the expertise and credibility 
of representatives from the PMO, as military members of the 
U.S. Government, were critical to potential buyers and took 
precedence over any information presented by the contractor. 
Throughout the 1993 Abu Dhabi Exhibition for example, 
potential buyers stated that information presented by the 
PMO was of critical importance to them. Due to the PMO's 
experience and knowledge of the vehicles capability, 
potential buyers of the vehicles were more confident of the 
responses from the PMO, rather than those of the contractor. 
In fact, the officials from Thailand were so impressed with 
the demonstrations and the information given concerning the 
vehicle and its capabilities that a LOR was sent to the 
United States. Upon receipt of the LOR, the PMO was 
immediately informed and was involved in open dialog with 
the Thailand officials at an early stage in the FMS process. 
Likewise, when vehicles belonging to the 
FMTVs were tested in Kuwait, a representative from the PMO 
was present throughout the demonstration to observe and 
support the U.S. contractor and to provide information for 
discussions. Although the contracting representative tried 
to work in concert with the PMO in answering questions, the 
Kuwaiti military officials expressed a preference for 
discussing the vehicle characteristics and capabilities with 
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the military members from the Project Management Office. 
During the conduct of the testing, the PMO learned that some 
of the Kuwaiti senior leadership did not have sufficient 
knowledge of the trucks to reach an adequate procurement 
decision and were completely unreceptive to contractor 
provided information. Additionally, rumors planted by other 
worldwide competitors had swayed the Kuwaiti leadership into 
believing that the Pentagon had suspended all testing of the 
FMTV, making it an undesirable vehicle for purchase. Thus, 
to counteract these accusations, and to inform the Kuwaiti 
leadership of the capabilities of the vehicles, an 
appointment with Kuwaiti military and Government officials 
was arranged by the PMO to further discuss these issues. The 
PMO briefed on the entire FMTV program, to include testing 
statistics, vehicle specifications and capabilities, medium 
tactical vehicle comparison statistics, and the strength of 
the U.S. spare parts system. Additionally, the PMO 
established credibility with the Kuwaiti officials by 
expounding on personal experiences of truck performance in 
Operation Desert Storm and comparing those truck experiences 
with the capabilities of vehicles belonging to the Family of 
Medium Tactical Vehicles. Consequently, this personalized 
dialog, coupled with real-world experience, resulted in a 
more favorable attitude toward the FMS of the Family of 
Medium Tactical Vehicles. 
Subsequent to two days of desert terrain 
testing, the Kuwaitis completed the truck trials and then 
spoke with the PMO regarding a recommendation for the actual 
type of purchase - FMS or direct commercial sale.  The 
58 
decision for the sale of the FMTVs through FMS, as opposed 
to direct commercial sales, was decided subsequent to 
information provided by the Project Management Office. The 
Kuwaitis determined that a sale through FMS would allow for 
greater overall vehicle support from the U.S. Government, 
particularly in the logistical support area. Because 
follow-on support was directly linked to weapon systems 
operations and maintenance crew training, Kuwait expected to 
capitalize on the experience and knowledge of the PMO 
through the recommendation for the appropriate support 
requirements necessary for the sale. Thus, the resulting 
draft Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement, 
provided through FMS, was vastly important to maintaining 
vehicle readiness and was recommended by the Project 
Management Office. 
(3) Post Negotiations. Following negotiations 
with country representatives, the PMO was instrumental in 
problem-solving throughout the Pre-LOA phase of the vehicle 
procurement. In the FMS case with Thailand, for example, the 
criticality of the PMOs assistance was demonstrated by the 
request from Stewart and Stevenson (S&S) for assistance from 
the Project Management Office. Stewart and Stevenson 
contacted the PMO, and asked for assistance in keeping the 
'ball rolling' with the Thailand Government [Ref. 33: p.l]. 
Although the Thailand Government had contacted the 
contractor for further information, they were not satisfied 
with the information received. Consequently, the contractor 
was concerned about losing a potential sale and therefore 
requested assistance from the Project Management Office. 
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The PMO responded by contacting Thailand to see if they 
needed any assistance in understanding the capabilities of 
the vehicle. Eventually, the PMO made recommendations 
concerning which vehicles in the family would best satisfy 
their mission requirements. 
Similarly, with regard to the Kuwaiti case, 
S&S contacted the PMO to support additional FMTV truck tests 
and demonstrations in Kuwait. As one of the competitors for 
a potential truck sale to Kuwait, S&S received an initial 
invitation from Kuwait requesting competitive testing and 
demonstration of the 2.5 ton truck belonging to the Family 
of Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. After receiving this 
request, S&S realized that they needed assistance obtaining 
various permits to transport the vehicles to Kuwait. Stewart 
& Stevenson had obtained air freight space on Air France 
airlines from Houston Intercontinental Airport to ship the 
vehicle from the manufacturing facility in Texas to Kuwait. 
Although shipping documentation was prepared in accordance 
with the same procedures previously used on another 
shipment, the U.S. Customs Service would not allow shipment 
of the vehicle. The U.S. Customs representative advised S&S 
that the Customs interpretation of the regulation was that 
the vehicle was specifically designed, modified, or equipped 
to mount or carry weapons as defined in the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulation, Category VII. Thus, S&S had to 
obtain clearance from the U.S. Department of State to ship 
the vehicle. After further discussions between S&S and U.S. 
Customs, S&S could not receive the clearance. This situation 
created a significant frustration in the shipment process, 
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and S&S then resorted to contacting the PMO for assistance. 
[Ref. 33:p. 1] 
Since the Kuwaiti truck test was supported by 
the PMO, the PMO assisted in the release of the vehicle. 
After numerous calls by the PMO to agencies within the State 
and Commerce Departments, as well as, the U.S. Customs 
Service, the State Department finally cooperated and granted 
a Temporary Export License. Without the perseverance of the 
PMO in assisting the contractor, the vehicle would not have 
been released. After obtaining clearance for vehicle 
shipment, S&S contacted the airline, only to learn that the 
cargo space had been sold! Because the airline was told by 
U.S. Customs officials that the vehicle would not be shipped 
that day, the airline sold the space. Consequently, the PMO 
was again contacted by S&S to assist in maintaining an open 
dialog with Kuwait to explain the shipment circumstances. 
Eventually, the demonstration vehicle arrived in Kuwait and 
was tested against the other tactical vehicles. But this 
occurred only after the continual assistance from the 
Project Management Office. 
b.        LOA    Phase 
In both FMS cases, drafting of the LOA occurred 
only after information was provided from the Project 
Management Office. Compilation of the LOA data and 
subsequent signing of the contract (Thailand) required 
extensive PMO involvement. For example, the actual LOA 
pricing estimates were negotiated between the Acquisition 
Center of the Tank - Automotive Command and the contractor, 
but with significant input from the Project Management 
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Office. Additionally, recommendations for sustainment items 
and services necessary to support the customer country were 
also provided by the Project Management Office. 
Although the security assistance community 
technically has the leadership for recommending major 
elements constituting the FMS agreement, in actuality, 
during the LOA phase of the FMS case the PMO provided vital 
information. For example, during the negotiations between 
the U.S. Government and Thailand, the actual production plan 
quantities were provided by the Project Management Office. 
Thus, the FMS agreement that resulted as a cost- 
reimbursement contract between Thailand and the U.S. 
Government was directly influenced by the PMO's production 
and fielding plan. In fact, the negotiation could not have 
occurred without the PMO's input from these respective 
plans. 
Likewise, in the drafting of the unofficial LOA 
for Kuwait, the same information was provided by the PMO, 
and was used to formulate the potential FMS agreement for 
Kuwait. 
2.   Differences 
a.   Pre-LOA Phase 
During the Pre-LOA phase of both FMS cases, 
differences in the effectiveness of information exchange was 
affected primarily by the actions of the Project Management 
Office. 
Analysis of the Thailand case revealed that the 
initial openness and trust of the dialog between the trading 
countries was fostered by the Project Management Office. 
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For example, realizing that it was critical to maintain a 
good working relationship with the Thailand Government, the 
PMO sent a letter to the Commander, Supply and 
Transportation Command, Thailand. This letter reiterated 
the U.S. commitment to the production, fielding, and testing 
of the FMTVs, and ensured a better negotiation atmosphere. 
Unlike Thailand, however, the Kuwaiti officials 
were not as responsive to the negotiations with the United 
States. During the initial negotiations, the PMO was not 
directly involved. Consequently, the PMO was unable to 
foster a continued open rapport with Kuwaiti officials, 
unlike the situation with Thailand. 
Another difference in the PMO actions of both FMS 
cases occurred during the security assistance review. In 
the Thailand case, the PMO was influential in exchanging 
important facts and information relevant to the FMS of the 
vehicles. During the latter end of this security assistance 
review, the Thailand officials wanted a complete briefing on 
the capabilities and characteristics of the vehicles and 
requested opinions from the Project Management Office. A 
video depicting the ability of the FMTV to traverse 
difficult terrain and secondary roads and a question and 
answer period hosted by the PMO, concluded the conference. 
Thus, the PMOs knowledge and influence during the security 
assistance  conference  were of  significant  importance. 
Regarding the Kuwaiti case, a vital opportunity to 
exchange important information from the PMO was lost, 
because a security assistance review did not occur. 
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Jb.   LOA Implementation Phase 
During the Implementation phase, the PMOs 
knowledge of the acquisition strategy was paramount to 
fulfilling the FMS agreement. In the Thailand case, for 
example, since Thailand decided to purchase some of the new 
trucks slated for the U.S., the PMO provided the production 
and fielding plan necessary to implement the FMS agreement. 
Additionally, the PMO's knowledge of the vehicle and its 
capabilities were vital in proposing the appropriate 
training needed to operate the vehicles, type and quantity 
of spare parts, support equipment, quality assurance team 
support and equipment publications. Consequently, the PMO 
was instrumental in deciding how the U.S. Government would 
fulfill the negotiated FMS agreement. 
In the Kuwaiti case the security assistance 
community was primarily involved with the unofficial 
implementation plan. However, they did not have the 
knowledge to make adequate recommendations in critical areas 
such as support requirements. 
C.   FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCIES 
INVOLVED IN THE FMS VEHICLE PROCESS 
In both FMS cases, several security assistance agencies 
contributed to the preparation and implementation of the FMS 
cases. These agencies included: the Defense Security 
Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Department of the Army, Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Logistics (DA DCSLOG) , U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command  (USASAC),  and the Tank  - Automotive 
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Command Security Assistance Center (TSAC). This section 
will present an analysis of the primary functions actually 
performed by these activities to assist in answering the 
subsidiary question: "What Security assistance agencies were 
primarily involved with the vehicle FMS process, and what 
activities of these agencies were actually performed by the 
PMO?" 
1.   Defense Security Assistance Agency 
Analysis of the actual actions performed by the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) revealed that their 
primary function is that of an approval authority for LOAs 
in the FMS process. For example, functionally, the DSAA was 
the official Government-to-Government interface between the 
U.S. Government and both customer countries and was the 
official advocate for the Army security assistance programs 
worldwide. As such, both countries submitted their LORs, 
through the DSAA for approval and official implementation. 
Additionally, the DSAA was responsible for determining if 
the U.S. Government would respond positively or negatively 
to the LORs submitted by Thailand and Kuwait. Included in 
this decision was the initiation of the security assistance 
reviews that are performed for each foreign country seeking 
to purchase the new vehicles. These reviews were merely the 
visible peak of the iceberg among the myriad bureaucratic 
activities (congressional reviews, approvals, defense, item 
list reviews, etc.) necessary to finally result in an FMS 
approval for procurement. 
However,  analysis revealed that the PMO was the agency 
that was instrumental in leading and facilitating actions in 
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the Pre-LOA phase. For example, it was the PMO who assisted 
and made recommendations for vehicle requirements 
determination for both customer countries. It was the PMO 
who sent letters and participated in truck demonstrations 
for both countries. In fact, the PMO led during the entire 
FMS process! 
2. Department Of The Army, Deputy Chief Of Staff, 
Logistics 
Although the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Logistics, is technically responsible for the 
complete LOA phase of the FMS process, analysis revealed 
that some of their responsibilities were actually performed 
by the Project Management Office. For example, the 
Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics is 
primarily responsible for performing a centralized control 
function of the LOA Development phase, specifically 
providing oversight during LOA negotiations. However, during 
the actual negotiations between both countries, the PMO was 
a key member of the negotiation team, providing critical 
information pertaining to the fulfillment of the FMS 
agreement. 
3. U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 
The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) 
functions as the Army's operational control for security 
assistance programs. It is responsible for implementing and 
controlling the FMS program, once obtaining LOR approval 
from the DSAA and obtaining approval for the LOA from the 
Office of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Logistics. However, the analysis with respect to the FMS 
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cases revealed that the majority of the actions of this 
agency were actually performed by the Project Management 
Office, as depicted in Table 1. 
4.   Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance 
Center 
The execution of all tactical wheeled vehicle LOAs is 
one of the primary functional responsibilities of the Tank - 
Automotive Command Security Assistance Center, however, the 
PMO actually performs many of these functions without 
resources. Currently, the Tank - Automotive Command Security 
Assistance Center is funded to provide all staffing and 
other support for all FMS activities throughout the entire 
FMS process. However, new production FMS cases such as the 
FMTVs, require the direct involvement of the Project 
Management Office. New production vehicle systems are 
solely managed by the PMO, not the Tank - Automotive Command 
Security Assistance Center. Therefore, the leadership of the 
PMO is necessary to fulfill the contract requirements of the 
FMS agreement. But, in the existing process, the PMO is 
not funded to perform necessary activities vital to 
consummating the FMS transaction. For example, examination 
of the Thailand case reveals that the PMO performed crucial 
activities throughout the entire FMS process (see Table 1). 
Yet, the PMO was not funded to provide these activities. 
Consequently, resources were obtained from within the budget 
of the Project Management Office. 
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1. Pre-LOA Phase DSAA PM 
Pre-LOA Discussions DSAA PM 
Requirements Determination DSAA PM 
LOR Submitted DSAA DSAA 
Security Asst Review DSAA DSAA 
Review of Congressional Data DSAA DSAA 
Decision to Act on LOR DA DCSLOG DA DCSLOG 
2. LOA Development Phase TSAC PM 
LOA Negotiations TSAC TSAC/PM 
Assigned Country Manager TSAC TSAC 
Case Identifier Assigned TSAC TSAC 
Request Vehicle Pricing Quotes TSAC PM 
Request for Price Adjustments TSAC PM 
LOA Item Identification: TSAC PM 
Delivery of Vehicles TSAC PM 
Paint Color TSAC PM 
Concurrent Spare Parts TSAC TSAC/PM 
Support Maintenance TSAC PM 
Publications TSAC PM 
Training Items TSAC PM 
Quality Assurance Teams TSAC PM 
Pricing for all Items TSAC PM 
TransmittalofLOA DSAA DSAA 
DA Approval for LOA DA DCSLOG DA DCSLOG 
DoD Approval for LOA DSAA DSAA 
3.   LOA Implementation Phase TSAC PM 
Payment Schedule USASAC USASAC 
Delivery Schedule TSAC PM 
Initial Deposit TSAC PM 
Cost Summary TSAC TSAC/PM 
Requisitions for Parts;   Support 
Support Items; Maintenance 
TSAC PM 
Request to Obligate Money 
to Buy Vehicles. 
DSAA/TSAC DSAA/TSAC 
Modification of Contract TSAC PM 
Customer Signature on FMS Case USASAC/TSAC USASAC/TSAC 
4.   LOA Execution TSAC PM 
Funds Requisitioned TACOM Matrix PM/TACOM Matrix 
Production Performed PM PM 
Delivery of Vehicles TSAC PM Will Perform 
Quality Assurance Inspections TSAC PM Will Perform 
Table 1.  Actual PMO Actions During the New Vehicle FMS 
Process 
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D.   FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMENT ROLE ANALYSIS: PROJECT MANAGER 
This section presents an analysis of the functional 
management role of the PM as exemplified in the two FMS 
cases throughout the various LOA phases. The functional 
role of the PM will be analyzed with respect to the actions 
performed by military members within the Project Management 
Office. Analyzing this section seeks to assist in answering 
the primary thesis question of "What should be the 
functional management role of the PM in the FMS process for 
new tactical wheeled vehicles?" 
1.   Functional Management Role Theory 
The functional management role of the PM is significant 
with respect to FMS cases involving the production of new 
equipment. The Packard Commission studied the issue of 
defense acquisition management to devise a more efficient 
and effective acquisition process. One of the 
recommendations of the Commission was the creation of a 
single position responsible for acquisition. Based on this 
recommendation, the position and function of the PEO was 
created in 1986 [Ref. 30: p. 11]. As a result of this 
newly-created position, DoD charged PEOs and PMs with the 
responsibility of managing their individual programs 
throughout their life cycles. In essence, the primary 
function of the PM is to field a cost-effective solution to 
the approved mission need. But, how does the PM perform 
this primary management function? 
To answer this question, the terminology of 'function,' 
'role' and 'manager' must be clearly understood. When 
applied  to  management,  the  term  'function'  means  the 
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activities which managers undertake as managers. The term 
* role' may be thought of as a collection of patterns of 
behavior. A 'functional role' then, may be thought of as a 
normative concept - a generalization of what collective 
actions are undertaken or done, rather than a specific 
action in a specific situation. A 'manager' is the 
individual who manages; a participant involved in the 
process of running an enterprise. Thus, the 'functional 
management role of the manager,' is a generalization about 
the activities performed by an individual, which may affect 
the quality of a synchronized effort, and for which the 
individual is responsible. [Ref. 26:p. 11] 
In concert with this management view of the PM, it is 
the civilian sector's (civilian Project Management 
Institute) charge that the PM is responsible for 
coordinating and integrating program activities across all 
organizational lines, while performing various functional 
roles. These functional management roles, as postulated by 
Harold Kerzner, primarily involve actions resulting in 
management interface, or liaison activities. He states that 
the PM is responsible for managing all human relationships 
within the organization and for coping with all public and 
client relationships [Ref. 26:p. 11]. Similarly, another 
theorist - Henry Mintzberg - stated that the manager's job 
was described by functional roles. These roles are: 
figurehead, leader, liaison, monitor, disseminator, 
spokesperson, entrepreneur, disturbance handler, and 
resource allocator. Mintzberg concluded that all managers 
fluctuate between these functional roles during the course 
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of their management tenure [Ref. 27:p. 52]. Thus, using the 
definition of 'functional management role,' in addition to 
selected roles from Mintzberg's list, an analysis of both 
FMS cases is presented below. 
2.   Liaison Or Facilitator Role 
In both FMS cases, beginning with the initial pre- 
procurement negotiations and vehicle demonstration 
activities that preceded the determination of the recipient 
governments requirements, the PMO assumed a liaison or 
facilitators role. Although the 1993 International Defense 
Exhibition in Abu Dhabi was not an officially sponsored DoD 
event, the PMO took a leadership stance. The PMO attended 
to support U.S. firms that interacted with the PMO, and to 
learn what other countries were offering in the tactical 
vehicle world market. Because this event was not an 
official DoD sponsored event, the U.S. lacked the official 
representation to facilitate Government-to-Government 
discussions. Many foreign dignitaries however, did not want 
to speak to S&S, the contractor, but rather began conferring 
with the representative from the Project Management Office. 
Because the PMO representative was military, he was 
therefore essential in promoting the equipment and 
facilitating the information exchange to the foreign 
dignitaries. As a liaison for the U.S. Government, the PMO 
was therefore credible, since this office knew the 
capabilities of the equipment, and could relate strategic 
real-world advantages of owning the vehicles. These foreign 
dignitaries had an inherent distrust of contractors, as they 
were  regarded  as  salesmen,  and  thus  unlikely  to  be 
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objective. Indeed, many foreign countries had the 
perception that the contractor's primary goal was to sell 
their product, and were not interested in determining what 
equipment was best for the customer. For this reason, the 
PMO, as the Government-to-Government representative, added 
credibility to the sale of the vehicle systems. 
Likewise, as a liaison in the Kuwait FMS case, the PMO 
was crucial in establishing credibility with Kuwaiti 
Government officials. The senior military leadership was 
unreceptive to contractor comments, but focused on 
information presented only by the PMO. After the truck 
trials, the PMO was able to gain an audience with senior 
military leaders to discuss detailed aspects of the vehicle, 
due to his position as a U.S. Government military member. 
Personalizing his own experience of truck performance in 
Operation Desert Storm, the PMO was able to make an 
effective presentation of the FMTV capabilities. 
Consequently, analysis of both FMS cases revealed that the 
liaison and facilitation role displayed by the PMO was 
critical in establishing credibility with the customer 
country representatives. 
3.   Disseminator Of Information 
Following the demonstrations in both cases, the PMO 
became more of a disseminator of information. Since the PMO 
was responsible for the vehicle systems acquisition project 
management, the LORs from both countries requesting price & 
availability data was submitted to the Project Management 
Office [Ref. 25] . As the project acquisition manager, the 
PM intimately knew all aspects of the program including the 
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production and development schedule. The PMO also 
consistently interacted with the contractor, disseminating 
pertinent program information between the contractor and the 
Tank - Automotive Command Security assistance Center. One 
such example occurred when the PMO provided the Tank - 
Automotive Command Security assistance Center with the 
pertinent data required for immediate feedback to the 
customer's Letter of Request [Ref. 19]. Thus, analysis 
revealed that the PM's role of disseminator of information 
was crucial in facilitating a smooth dialog of information 
sharing among the customer, contractor and the security 
assistance community. 
4.   Leadership Role 
In both cases, during the negotiations between the U.S. 
Government and senior foreign officials, the PMO assumed a 
leadership role. Since the security assistance community 
(Defense Security Assistance Agency, U.S. Army Security 
Assistance Command, Tank - Automotive Command Security 
Assistance Center) activities were reactive as opposed to 
proactive, the PMO played an aggressive leadership role in 
pursuing both countries interest in the acquiring of the 
Family of Medium of Tactical Vehicles. For example, 
official letters were sent from the PMO emphasizing the U.S. 
commitment to the production of FMTVs and offering 
assistance in providing information on the vehicles. 
In the Thailand case, the PMO performed a leadership 
role throughout the process, although it was initially 
curtailed by the security assistance community. The 
leadership actions of the PMO were effective in assisting 
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the scheduling and conduct of the Thailand security- 
assistance review and facilitating the FMS negotiations. 
Although the PMO was taking this leadership role, a problem 
arose within the security assistance community. 
Technically, the security assistance community was 
responsible for taking the lead in communication with the 
foreign Government and in negotiating with the customer. 
However, they had been reactive up to this juncture and they 
did not want the PMO present during the initial phases of 
the conference. Consequently, the actions taken by the 
security assistance community initially curtailed effective 
negotiations. 
These curtailing actions had a negative impact on 
communication with the Thailand officials, because their 
cultural traditions dictated social considerations before 
business transactions. Because the PMO was not present for 
the initial conference introductions and socializing events, 
the Thailand officials were not comfortable speaking with 
the Project Management Office. In countries such as 
Thailand, these socializing events are extremely important, 
as a prelude to further negotiations. Consequently, 
communication between the PMO and Thailand was hampered, due 
to this perceived slight in courtesy and custom. 
Additionally, the PMO was unfamiliar with both the U.S. and 
the Thailand Government officials involved in the 
negotiation process. Thus, the PMO was at a complete 
disadvantage. 
Additionally, during the implementation and execution 
of the LOA for the Thailand case, the PM actually determined 
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how the case requirement was to be accomplished. For 
example, the PM decided to alter the original production 
plan, whereby Thailand would receive vehicles slated for the 
United States. Subsequently, the PM had to obtain 
permission from the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Operations, to authorize this change. 
Additionally, the PM took the lead in initiating and 
ensuring that a contract modification recouped the quantity 
of vehicles for the United States. Thus, analysis revealed 
that in both FMS cases, the PM continually maintained a 
leadership role throughout the FMS process that was 
essential for effective FMS case management. 
5.   Disturbance Handler 
Analysis also revealed that the PMO performed the role 
of disturbance handler. As a disturbance handler, the PMO 
played a significant role in assisting with the shipment of 
FMTVs to Kuwait for country demonstrations. In compliance 
with a request by Kuwait for truck demonstrations, S&S 
attempted to ship vehicles to Kuwait. During the process of 
gaining permission from the applicable U.S. Government 
agencies, the PMO was contacted for assistance with these 
agencies in obtaining clearance for the vehicles. After 
numerous discussions among three different agencies, the PMO 
resolved the problem for the contractor. This incident 
revealed the significance of the PM in acting as a 
disturbance handler in the FMS process. The PM's ability to 
resolve issues was paramount to fulfilling the customer's 
request, thereby ensuring that FMS activities continued. 
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E.   ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FMS AND THE PM 
The presentation and analysis of both FMS cases 
revealed that the influence and involvement of the PMO was 
interspersed and extremely important throughout all phases 
of the FMS process. But, were the actions of the PMO within 
ethical parameters? This section presents an analysis which 
addresses the subsidiary question: "What are the ethical 
considerations inherent in FMS cases, that the PM must 
regard." 
1.   Background 
Chapter II and III of this thesis presented the 
relevant laws, regulations, directives, and policies that 
pertain to the implementation of FMS cases. Of these, the 
most pertinent that directly affect the ethical actions of 
the PMO during the conduct of FMS transactions are addressed 
below. Analysis of these primary ethical guidelines 
revealed, however, that many of the policies contradict each 
other. 
a. U.S.   Law:   Foreign Assistance Act,   Section 515 
This law is the basis for all actions by the PMO 
during FMS transactions. It states that the President is to 
instruct all personnel that they should not encourage, 
promote or influence the purchase of U.S. made military 
equipment, unless specifically instructed by the appropriate 
agencies of the U.S. Government. [Ref. 29:p. 515] 
b. DoD Policy:  DoD Manual  5105.38-M 
This DoD policy manual is the basis for all 
military Service policies concerning the marketing of 
defense equipment.   It states that sales will be approved 
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only when they are consistent with U.S. foreign policy 
interests. Additionally, marketing is to left to U.S. 
defense industries, unless it is specifically approved in 
advance by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. [Ref. 36: 
p. 600-1] 
c.   Department  Of The Army Memorandum,   Subject: 
Marketing Of U.S.   Defense Equipment 
Although DoD manual 5105.38-M prohibits marketing, 
this Department of the Army memorandum encourages the 
support of marketing efforts! Conversely, it also stipulates 
remaining neutral between U.S. competitors! The major 
elements of this memorandum are as follows: [Ref. ll:p.l] 
• Support marketing efforts of U.S. companies. 
• Provide country information. 
• Assist with visit appointments. 
• Remain neutral between U.S. competitors. 
d.       Army Acquisition Executive Policy Memorandum 
#90-7,   Subject:   Security Assistance 
Although the Department of the Army Memorandum, 
Subject: Marketing of U.S. Defense Equipment, encourages the 
support of marketing efforts, Army Acquisition Executive 
Policy memorandum #90-7 contradicts this by stating that 
marketing should be left to contractors, although the PMO 
should facilitate sales when possible! [Ref. 10:p. 1]. The 
pertinent elements of this memorandum are as follows: 
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• Marketing should be left to contractors, but 
the PMO should facilitate sales when possible. 
• PMs should participate in the development and 
execution of security assistance agreements. 
• When it will enhance national security- 
interests, provide the materials to demonstrate 
the system to assist in either the coproduction 
or sale of the item. 
e.       U.S.     Army Security Assistance Command 
Memorandum,    Subject:    Security   Assistance   Support    For   FMS 
Cases Involving Tactical  Wheeled Vehicles 
Although Army Acquisition Executive Policy #90-7 
states that the PM should facilitate sales when possible, 
this memorandum specifies that the PM should have limited 
authority! The pertinent elements of this memorandum are as 
follows: [Ref. 14:p. 1] 
• PMs should be integrated with Security 
assistance, due to their technical knowledge of 
their systems, but with parameters limiting 
their authority. 
• Security assistance representatives should be 
included in all discussions with foreign 
representatives, and Security assistance 
agencies will determine if the PMO needs to be 
present. 
• The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 
should be the provider of all information to 
the customer country, and the responder to all 
requests (including technical questions). 
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2.   Ethical Considerations 
Analysis reveals that there are two primary ethical 
considerations that should be addressed regarding the PM's 
actions during FMS transactions. These are: marketing of 
U.S. defense equipment, and a conflict of interest 
concerning the relationship between the PM and the 
contractor. 
a. Marketing Of U.S. Defense Equipment 
Actions by the PMO in support of FMS transactions, 
could be misconstrued as marketing, however current policy 
guidance on PMO actions regarding this issue is unclear. 
Analysis of the Thailand case revealed, for example, that 
the PMO's briefing and video on the capabilities and 
characteristics of the FMTVs to the Thailand officials were 
instrumental in FMS negotiations for the sale of the 
vehicles. But, was this action considered unethical and 
construed as marketing for a U.S. firm? Analysis with 
respect to the current policies reveals that the answer to 
this question is equivocal. 
Current policies divulge the ambiguous and 
contradictory nature of guidance given to the Project 
Managers. Both DoD and Army policies currently encourage 
the PM to support security assistance programs when 
possible, and also encourage foreign country team support to 
U.S. defense industries engaged in marketing. In fact, Army 
Acquisition Executive Policy #90-7 states that the PM should 
facilitate sales when appropriate. But, how and when does 
the PM facilitate sales? The guidance is ambiguous, to say 
the least!  Indeed, the guidance is also contradictory!  For 
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example, DoD manual 5105.38-M states that marketing should 
be left to the U.S. defense industry, and that Security 
assistance Organizations should remain neutral between U.S. 
competitors.  Thus, the current guidance is not only vague, 
but also paradoxical. 
So, ethically, when is marketing appropriate? 
Some would say that it depends on whether coproduction or 
codevelopment practices are anticipated. Others say that it 
is dependent on whether there is a real need in the country, 
and that the sale will benefit U.S. national interest. 
Regardless of which response is given, however, under the 
strict letter of the law and current policy, the answer is a 
matter of  interpretation and circumstance! 
On the other hand, if analysis is conducted with 
respect to the intent of the law, the answer is more 
readily apparent: marketing should not be the goal for the 
PM, but he should have the flexibility to promote his 
equipment if the situation requires this action. For 
example, as purchases by foreign allies become more evident 
to other countries, the increased attention in a defense 
item may involve the PM through foreign country initiated 
inquiries. If a foreign Government is seeking information 
on the vehicle, the PM then has a vested stake in the proper 
promotion of the equipment. That is, the PM would be 
concerned that the vehicle system be fielded properly, fully 
supported within the country, and fielded in the most 
efficient manner possible. Additionally, he would be 
concerned about technical details such as: vehicle 
characteristics  and  capabilities  with  respect  to  the 
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mission, as well as, system production schedules, and 
testing data. Thus, in this type of situation, the PM 
should have the flexibility to promote the equipment. 
Ethically, then, marketing is appropriate when the 
circumstances require the PM to promote his equipment in 
response to customer inquiries. It is at this juncture that 
the PM is within the parameters of both the letter and 
intent of the current law by "facilitating sales when 
appropriate." 
b.        Conflict  Of Interest 
The PM's relationship with the contractor could be 
interpreted as a conflict of interest. Analysis revealed 
that there is continual interaction between the PMO and the 
contractor, when managing new production defense equipment. 
In fact, while responding to country inquiries, the PMO's 
actions could be misconstrued as benefiting the contractor 
by presenting visual materials and briefings necessary to 
address issues in response to customer inquiries. But, are 
these actions indicative of a conflict of interest for the 
Project Manager? 
Analysis of the Thailand and Kuwait FMS cases 
revealed that these actions did not result in a conflict of 
interest, but rather emphasized the unique relationship 
between the PM and the contractor. The contract between the 
U.S. Government and S&S is sole-source, Firm-Fixed-Price 
with Economic Price Adjustment, and the FMTV is already 
known worldwide as the U.S. choice for the tactical vehicle 
of the 21st Century. Additionally, it is also known that 
this vehicle can out-perform any vehicle that participated 
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in Operation Desert Storm. Consequently, as worldwide 
interest in the vehicle increases, through contractor 
demonstrations of the vehicle, the PM is involved more 
frequently with prospective buyers who have not yet decided 
between FMS or direct commercial sales. Although it could be 
argued that the FMS Total Package Approach (the U.S. 
Government sells the vehicle along with a complete support 
and sustainment package) is an optimum purchasing method, 
ethically, the PM must be objective enough to submit 
complete information to the potential customer. This action 
may then lead the customer to the contractor, through direct 
commercial sales. This is indeed a choice for the PM, since 
it may be easy to persuade the customer to obtain equipment 
through FMS, yet it may be just as beneficial for the 
customer to procure the equipment through the other sales 
option. Thus, the PM must avoid becoming a "salesman" for 
his equipment, but merely facilitate in the transfer of 
information, whereby the customer can make an objective 
decision regarding procurement. 
Likewise, the PM must also avoid becoming a puppet 
for commercial/industrial interests. During activities such 
as the international defense exhibitions, the PM and his 
representatives must maintain their posture as military 
representatives of the U.S. Government. Since the PM is a 
member of the U.S. military, his actions will reflect on the 
U.S. Government. Therefore, it is imperative that the 
actions of military members such as the PM, be 
unreproachable and not likened unto a 'car salesman.' 
Actions promoting the sales of equipment could place a 
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negative stigma on the U.S. Government, and may lead to 
comments by other nations of 'arms broker.' However, when a 
foreign Government expresses an interest with an intent to 
purchase a particular defense item, the PM should respond 
and promote the equipment. Consequently, although the sales 
of military equipment are of considerable importance to the 
PM, the PM's relationship with regard to the contractor and 
as a military member of the U.S. Government must be 
ethically correct, and in accordance with the appropriate 
requests from the customer country. 
With respect to conflicts of interest, other 
ethical considerations concern daily activities. The PMO 
must always perform their duties while maintaining the 
posture and demeanor of professional military officers. 
Similar to the PMO conduct in the FMS case with Kuwait, the 
PMO must not succumb to petty in-house rivalries and 
disagreements between Government offices, but rather strive 
to facilitate resolutions agreeable to all parties 
concerned. Ethically, the PMO must regard all agencies 
regulations and seek to find resolutions between the 
Government and contractors without circumventing the 
established policies. It is important to note however, that 
the PMO can realistically expect to foster an atmosphere of 
trust and mutual respect with the contractor. Indeed, 
analysis of both FMS cases revealed that the close working 
relationship that currently exists between the PMO and the 
contractor lends itself to a smoother dialog of information 
sharing and cooperation. This relationship is not unethical, 
so long as the PMO maintains a professional demeanor, stays 
83 
within policy parameters, and remembers that they ultimately 
represent the U.S. Government. 
F.   INDUSTRIAL BASE ANALYSIS 
Security assistance programs, such as FMS, have an 
enormous impact on the U.S. industrial base. This section 
presents an industrial base analysis which answers the 
subsidiary question: "What is the impact of FMS on the 
industrial base?" 
1.   General 
a.   Sustainment    Of   The   Manufacturing/Industrial 
Base 
While political and socioeconomic forces have been 
eroding the U.S. industrial base, analysis indicates that 
security assistance programs, such as FMS, have encouraged 
the continued sustainment of the manufacturing/industrial 
base through international sales of new defense items. 
Since the ending of the Cold War, and subsequent downsizing 
of the U.S. military, the industrial base of the U.S. has 
continued to also draw-down, due to shrinking DoD revenues. 
As DoD reduces spending for military equipment and services, 
companies in the U.S. defense industrial base are seeking 
to replace these lost domestic revenues with those obtained 
through Foreign Military Sales. 
Analysis of this issue reveals that one reason 
that FMS has encouraged sustainment of the 
manufacturing/industrial base lies in the generation of 
American jobs. For example, between FY 91-93, the U.S. 
exported approximately 18 billion dollars  (delivered)  of 
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military items annually [Ref. 34: p. 1] . For every one 
billion dollars spent, one estimate states that 
approximately 31,000 American jobs were generated [Ref. 2: 
p. 25] . Although the permanence of these jobs depends in 
part on whether U.S. manufacturers can continue to obtain 
new orders for military equipment exports, the data suggest 
that FMS encourages the employment outlook for Americans. 
Another reason FMS encourages sustainment of the 
industrial base regards the benefit from increased 
production rates - profit. As security assistance programs, 
such as FMS, facilitate the sale of weapon systems, Army 
programs benefit through increased production rates, and 
corresponding lower unit costs. These increased production 
rates generate profit for U.S. industry, leading to economic 
growth, which in turn encourages the continued commitment to 
manufacturing defense items. Thus, it is to the advantage 
of both industry and Government to encourage Foreign 
Military Sales. 
Although FMS can encourage sustainment of the 
industrial base, one inherent problem exists: worldwide 
arms competition. In the current world market, other 
countries are providing more competition, as the U.S. 
industrial base dwindles. In the wake of the downsizing of 
the U.S. defense industry, European and Asian countries are 
developing internationalism strategies to sustain their 
military base. For example, a study of the situation of the 
European Arms industry in 1992, concluded that "the 
development of national champions (monopoly suppliers in 
individual   European   countries)    and   proliferating 
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transnational ties, were the two dominant trends in the 
European defense industry in the 1980s." [Ref. l:p. 3] If 
these trends are realistic, the consequences for the U.S. 
and its industrial base are enormous. For the first time, 
the U.S. could see the emergence of a combined European arms 
industry that could not only rival the U.S., but also 
surpass our manufacturing capability. The reality of this 
is evident by the ever increasing European conglomerates of 
previously independent companies, that are now becoming more 
interconnected at the design, development, production, 
technical information exchange, and capital investment 
levels. Thus, the continual worldwide marketing of U.S. 
weapon systems is important for the survival of our 
industrial base. But, if the U.S. does not continue to 
market superior weapon systems, or seek alliances with 
allied nations, export sales will suffer, resulting in a 
negative impact on the U.S. industrial base. 
b.       Codevelopment And Coproduction 
Another major impact of FMS on the industrial base 
is the promotion of codevelopment and coproduction projects. 
Implementation of foreign manufacture programs by the U.S. 
Government can occur under FMS cases, which provide the 
recipient country with the necessary technical data to 
manufacture, or operate and maintain the defense item. 
Codevelopment and coproduction projects are thus options of 
FMS negotiations for recipient countries. Codevelopment 
occurs when the U.S. Government signs a Memorandum of 
Understanding with allies to jointly develop new systems, 
and share costs and data. Coproduction  occurs when the U.S. 
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Government signs a Memorandum of Understanding with allies 
to let DoD systems be produced outside the continental 
United States. In each of these cases, both industry and 
Government can benefit from the elimination of barriers to 
trade and investment. Cooperative trade and investment 
ventures can result in the promotion of a healthier economy 
and stronger industrial base. 
2. Impact Of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles FMS 
Currently, the U.S. leads the world market in truck 
technology and capability, which has resulted in an increase 
in FMS of tactical wheeled vehicle systems. [Ref. 17] The 
Tank - Automotive Command Security assistance Center active 
and projected FMS case loads (depicted at Figure 6) 
highlights the increase in FMS tactical wheeled vehicle 
cases. The impact of the increase in these truck FMS sales 
is discussed below. 
a. .Revenue For Future Defense Projects 
One of the major impacts of truck FMS transactions 
is the potential increase in revenue for future defense 
projects. In consonance with the draw-down of U.S. forces in 
Europe, perceived changes in national requirements, and 
because of the arms control commitments under the 1990 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, large quantities of 
trucks have become surplus to the U.S. vehicle inventory. 
These vehicles have been declared Excess Defense Articles 
and have been made available for Foreign Military Sales. 
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Figure 6.  TSAC Active and Projected FMS Case Loads 
88 
European Disposal Office of the U.S. DoD currently 
anticipates receiving 137,500 tons of major end items, and 
7,500 tons of spare parts by the end of 1995 [Ref. 31 :p. 
4 0] . Foreign Military Sales of these vehicles are used to 
finance future defense projects. Thus, the FMS of excess 
vehicles will eliminate unnecessary stockage and also return 
money to industry for the building of more defense projects, 
which in turn will promote the industrial base. 
b.       Promotes  The Stabilizing Of The Industrial 
Base Workforce 
One of the major impacts of vehicle FMS on the 
industrial base concerns the stabilizing of the current 
industrial base workforce. As more sales are generated 
through new production and vehicle modernization FMS cases, 
industry is bolstered, which in turn assists in the 
stabilizing of their workforce. The Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center total workload as of 
September 1993, included 724 active cases from 72 different 
countries and international organizations, totaling 7.4 
billion dollars (delivered and undelivered orders) [Ref. 
24]. Of these totals, truck sales totaled over 1.2 billion 
dollars consisting of both new production vehicles and 
modernization FMS cases. These cases included sustainment 
type logistical support packages, which were key selling 
features with many foreign Governments. With respect to new 
production vehicle FMS for example, the Kuwaitis decided to 
buy the FMTVs after the U.S. Government sold the vehicles 
using a total package approach. This approach included a 
sustainment logistics package, which made the vehicles a 
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more attractive purchase for the Kuwaitis. These sustainment 
packages directly equated to more business for industry, as 
the Government sought to supply the foreign customer with 
these vehicles and support packages. With respect to 
modernization cases, upgrades on various types of older 
generation vehicles have included procurement of both 
replacement parts and equipment training for the modernized 
equipment. In both instances, as new production and 
modernization FMS cases continue to be generated, industry 
workforce levels will stabilize to support these customer 
requirements. 
Additionally, increased sales of new production 
vehicles leading to contract modifications and amendments, 
have also promoted production and encouraged stabilizing the 
workforce. For example, negotiations between Thailand and 
the U.S. Government resulted in a modification to the 
original contract that allowed for an increase in the 
quantity of vehicles purchased by the U.S. Government. 
Thailand's procurement of these vehicles began during 
Milestone III of the acquisition cycle, which still had an 
impact on maintaining the current workforce necessary to 
produce the contracted equipment. Additionally, because the 
FMTVs were Non-developmental Items (NDI), several 
modifications were necessary to fulfill the military 
performance requirements stipulated by the FMS case. Among 
these modifications, S&S had to redo fuel tanks and 
lubricating systems, and waterproof the vehicle [Ref. 18]. 
These vehicles also had a technical data package that would 
be used in future production contracts (possibly extending 
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through 2 023) which also has encouraged the stabilizing of 
the current workforce. 
Modernization and upgrade FMS cases for new 
vehicles that will become obsolete in the future, can also 
generate future sales, promoting the stabilizing of the 
workforce. For example, although the FMTVs are planned to 
continue for at least 3 0 years, foreign countries may 
modernize or upgrade them in lieu of disposal at a later 
time. Because the FMTVs have 5 ton vehicles that are the 
only source of air-dropable vehicles in the 5 ton class, 
worldwide; and since both the 2.5 and 5 ton vehicles have a 
90% parts commonality among all variants of the family, 
countries may be encouraged to maintain these vehicles for 
an extended period of time. Assuming that other 
manufacturers do not produce a superior vehicle, the FMTVs 
will remain an attractive procurement. In any event, 
whether through increases in new production or increases in 
modernization FMS cases, industry is encouraged to stabilize 
the workforce as the quantity of exports increase. 
G.   SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an analyses of the Thailand and 
Kuwait FMS cases from five different perspectives. The 
comparative analysis revealed that information obtained from 
the PMO was critical for successful FMS transactions. The 
functional analysis revealed that the PMO actually performed 
many FMS actions without FMS funds. The functional 
management role analysis revealed that the PM performed 
primarily  leader  and  facilitator  roles.  The  ethical 
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consideration analysis revealed that current policies are 
contradictory in stipulating PM conduct. Finally, the 
industrial base analysis revealed that FMS is important to 
promoting the industrial base. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
A.   GENERAL 
As a consequence of the vastly changing global 
environment, and. demonstration of truck superiority in the 
Gulf War, U.S. friends and allies have sought to modernize 
their vehicle fleets with the most current U.S. military 
vehicle systems. Two such countries, Thailand and Kuwait, 
proceeded to perform this modernization task by procuring 
new production vehicles, through the security assistance 
program of Foreign Military Sales. The new vehicle systems 
sought by both countries were the FMTVs, which were managed 
solely by the PM, due to their program acquisition status. 
Consequently, the PM became immediately involved with the 
FMS transactions. However, previous FMS transactions, were 
the responsibility of the security assistance community, not 
the Project Manager. 
Prior to the insurgence of interest in new production 
equipment, the security assistance community provided the 
leadership throughout all phases of the FMS process. Since 
the Gulf War, however, the explosion of interest in 
procuring new equipment has increased the role and 
responsibilities of the PM in the FMS process. However, 
guidance delineating the actual functional management role 
of the PM, during the conduct of the FMS process for new 
production vehicles, is lacking. Additionally, PMs are not 
resourced to manage FMS transactions. Thus, analysis of the 
FMS cases for Thailand and Kuwait has demonstrated a need to 
determine the functional management role of the PM during 
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the conduct of the FMS process. Determination of the 
functional management role of the PM will result in an 
increased interest in future FMS, and improve the 
effectiveness of customer countries to procure tactical 
wheeled vehicles from the U.S. Government. 
B.   SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.   Comparative Analysis: PMO Actions In LOA Phases 
The comparative analysis examined similarities and 
differences of the PMOs actions in both FMS cases, with 
regard to the LOA phases. Similarities between both cases 
occurred during the Pre-LOA, and LOA phases; differences 
between both cases occurred during the Pre-LOA, LOA 
Implementation, and LOA Execution phases. With regard to 
this analysis, examination of the PMOs actions revealed the 
following: 1) vehicle demonstrations and subsequent 
information presented by the PMO were critical in assisting 
the customer country in their requirements determination; 2) 
the expertise, experience and credibility of the PMO as a 
military representative of the U.S. took precedence over any 
information submitted by the contractor; 3) compilation of 
this LOA data and subsequent signing of the FMS agreement 
(Thailand) required extensive PMO involvement; and, 4) the 
ability of the PMO to effectively communicate and create an 
atmosphere of trust between the U.S. Government and the 
customer country was vital to consummating an FMS 
transaction with Thailand. 
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2. Functional Analysis: Agencies Involved In The FMS 
Process 
The analysis of security assistance functional agencies 
involved in the FMS process examined four primary 
organizations that contributed to the preparation and 
implementation of the FMS cases: Defense Security Assistance 
Agency, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Logistics, U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Security Assistance 
Command, and the Tank - Automotive Command Security 
Assistance Center. Analysis of these agencies revealed that 
the primary function of the security assistance community 
was an approval authority for LOAs in the FMS process. 
Additionally, the PMO performed actions that were the 
responsibility of the security assistance community. Yet, 
the PMO was not funded to provide these activities. 
3. Functional Management Role Analysis: Project 
Manager 
The functional management role analysis of the PM 
examined both FMS cases in terms of the functional roles for 
managers developed by Henry Mintzberg. During the pre- 
procurement negotiations and vehicle demonstrations that 
occurred in the Pre-LOA phase for both countries, the PMO 
performed both leadership and facilitator roles. Following 
these initial demonstrations, the PMO performed the roles of 
Disseminator of Information and Disturbance Handler. 
Overall, however, The primary functional management roles 
that permeated throughout the various LOA phases of both FMS 
cases were leader and facilitator. 
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These dual roles of leader and facilitator were 
successful throughout the entire FMS process. As such, these 
functional management roles were analogous to the 
interaction between the hub of a wheel (the PM) , and its 
spokesv (all agencies interacting with the PM): all FMS 
actions were directed and facilitated by the Project Manager 
(see Figure 7) . Thus, the PM should perform the leadership 
role in FMS vehicle activities, while continuing to 
facilitate all FMS transactions. 
Figure 7. Activities Interacting With The PM During FMS 
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4. Ethical Considerations: FMS And The PM 
Analysis of the ethical considerations revealed that 
there are two primary issues that the PM should consider 
during the conduct of FMS transactions: marketing of U.S. 
defense equipment, and a conflict of interest concerning the 
relationship between the PM and contractor. Currently, DoD 
guidance is ambiguous and contradictory in specifying the 
conduct of the PM's actions during FMS transactions and the 
marketing of defense equipment. Consequently, ethical 
actions with respect to marketing are a matter of 
interpretation and circumstance. Analysis of the FMS cases 
revealed that the PM has continual interaction with the 
contractor that is not unethical. 
5. Industrial Base Analysis 
The industrial base analysis revealed that FMS serves 
to integrate, broaden and maintain the national industrial 
base. Among other factors, it encourages commitment to 
manufacturing defense items, promotes codevelopment and 
coproduction, increases revenues for future defense 
projects, and promotes the stabilizing of the industrial 
base workforce. 
C.   LESSONS LEARNED 
This section discusses the primary important lessons 
learned from the analyses of the Thailand and Kuwait FMS 
cases, and answers the subsidiary thesis question "What are 
the lessons learned from the Thailand and Kuwait FMS Cases?" 
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1. The PM Is The Leader And Facilitator Of The 
FMS Transaction 
The PM is the actual leader and facilitator of new 
production, vehicle FMS transactions. The procurement of new 
production transportation systems requires the PM's direct 
involvement, as he is the sole manager of the project. As a 
leader and facilitator, the PM is the management interface 
between Government agencies to facilitate the FMS process 
through different activities, and is the central point of 
contact for customer country concerns. 
2. The PM Is The Expert Who Lends Credibility To The 
Project 
The PM is the expert on the capabilities of the weapon 
systems, who, as a U.S. Government military member, also 
lends credibility to the information presented concerning 
the system. Unlike the contractor, the PM is the who can 
answer most tactical and technical questions. Some 
contractors do not know the true tactical capabilities of 
the equipment, or how the system will perform in a combat 
scenario. They lack the real-world strategic knowledge of 
the equipment that the customer wants. Further, many foreign 
Governments do not trust contractor representatives, and 
therefore will not rely on their information. Thus, the PM 
provides both the knowledge of the vehicles characteristics 
and capabilities, as well as, the credibility as a military 
member of the U.S. Government to present the information. 
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3. The PM Is The Problem-Solver Among The Customer, 
Contractor And The U.S. Government 
Examination of similarities in both FMS cases revealed 
that the PM was instrumental in continuing to problem-solve 
throughout the entire Pre-LOA phase of the FMS process. Due 
to the PM's knowledge of the situations involved with these 
problems, the PM had the ability to resolve all issues 
germane to the FMS transactions. 
4. The PM Bridges The Gap Between The Security 
Assistance Community And The Customer 
An analysis of the differences in the actions of the 
PMO with regard to both FMS cases, reveals that the PM 
bridges the gap between the security assistance community 
and the foreign customer, ensuring a smooth transfer of 
information and a successful FMS transaction. 
5. The Security Assistance Community Has A Limited 
Involvement In The Current Vehicle FMS Process 
Although the security assistance community consists of 
the process experts, their primary involvement is in the 
approval of LOAs, whose data are actually compiled by the 
Project Management Office. 
6. The PMO Is Not Funded To Perform the Necessary FMS 
Activities 
In the existing FMS system, the Tank - Automotive 
Command Security Assistance Center is funded to provide all 
support for FMS activities, but the PMO is not. Yet, it is 
the PMO who actually performs the majority of the FMS 
activities. 
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7. The Current Policies Do Not Reflect the Efforts Of 
The PMO During The FMS Case Implementation Process 
There is an urgent need to revise the current policies 
to reflect the actual role and responsibilities of the PMO 
in the FMS process. Throughout the entire FMS process, the 
PMO performs the majority of the functions. Yet, current 
policies do not delineate the PMOs roles, responsibilities, 
or authority in FMS activities. 
8. The PMO Is Proactive; The Security Assistance 
Community Is Reactive 
Unlike the security assistance community, in both FMS 
cases, the PMO was quite active in providing information to 
Government officials and in providing truck demonstrations 
at the request of the customer countries. The security 
assistance community, however, did not become involved until 
after the customer country requested further information. 
9. The Presence Of The PMO Is Critical 
The Presence of the PMO is Critical in Facilitating 
Information Exchange and Minimizing the Adverse Affects of 
Cultural Differences. As revealed in the Thailand case, the 
PMO was not present for the initial conferences and 
socializing events. This curtailed the ability of the PMO to 
share his knowledge concerning vehicle capability, which 
ultimately hampered the negotiation process. Additionally, 
the lack of the PMOs presence during the initial social 
events associated with the security assistance review was 
perceived as a cultural slight. 
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10. Current Policies Are Ambiguous And Contradictory- 
Current policies at all agency levels are ambiguous and 
contradictory concerning PM guidance on the marketing of 
U.S. defense equipment. The Foreign Assistance Act is 
unclear regarding this issue, giving only broad guidance, 
and DoD policies contradict Army policies. 
11. A Good Working Relationship Between The PMO, And 
The Contractor Is Key 
A good working relationship between the PMO and the 
contractor is vital for successful implementation of FMS 
cases. Analysis of both FMS cases revealed that a good 
working relationship between the PMO and the contractor 
lends itself to a smooth dialog of information sharing and 
cooperation. This relationship, coupled with an atmosphere 
of trust and mutual respect, is paramount to successful 
implementation of FMS cases. 
12. FMS Encourages Sustainment Of The Industrial Base 
FMS encourages the continued commitment to sustainment 
of the manufacturing/industrial base needed for future 
mobilization. Through continued arms exports, American jobs 
are stabilized or created; Army programs benefit through 
increased production rates; and industry receives more 
profit. All of these benefits occur as a result of FMS 
transactions. 
13. Worldwide Arms Competition May Hamper Future Sales 
Capabilities Of The U.S. 
The adverse effects of worldwide arms competition 
should be taken into consideration with regard to future 
sales capabilities of weapon systems. Analysis confirms that 
101 
if revenue from export sales to foreign Governments is lost, 
the defense industry remaining in the U.S. may continue to 
decline. 
14. The U.S. May Have To Establish Codevelopment And 
Coproduction Alliances 
The current trend of European community alliances may 
require the U.S. to establish codevelopment and coproduction 
alliances to preserve the U.S. leadership position in weapon 
systems exports. The increasing development of European and 
Asian arms industry conglomerates could surpass future U.S. 
manufacturing capability. This competition could have 
tremendous negative effects on the U.S. industrial base, and 
may require the U.S. to seek manufacturing alliances to 
protect the U.S. leadership in future world arms exports. 
15. The FMS Of Trucks Have A Positive Impact On The 
Industrial Base 
The FMS of trucks benefits the industrial base by 
increasing revenue for future defense projects, as well as, 
stabilizing and creating jobs through modernization and 
upgrade FMS cases. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   GENERAL 
As we look toward the 21st Century, we must keep our 
minds open to change, and reinvention. We need to make 
paradigm shifts to keep up with swiftly evolving political 
and economic realities. Indeed, the security assistance 
community is looking for new, innovative ways to meet 
requirements and resource challenges brought about by recent 
fiscal realities [Ref. 21]. Perhaps the way to accomplish 
this is by envisioning and developing imaginative policies 
and plans that heretofore, may not have been employed. But, 
given the changing environment, we must change; we must 
adapt; we must survive! Our approach must be futuristic to 
overcome the parochialism that previously made us narrow- 
minded. Thus, in light of recent global changes, we need to 
change. We need to revise policies, and rethink our 
strategies. Perhaps some of these changes should also 
include shifting more to private business strategies. 
Indeed, we can do smarter things by using sound business 
practices to make defense more cost effective, while 
maintaining our technological advantage. 
One such sound business practice should include the 
sanction by Department of the Army to allow the PM to 
maintain a 'cradle to grave' management of his project, 
including peripheral activities such as Foreign Military 
Sales. Previously, the PM has not had the authority to lead 
in new production FMS cases; however, the past should not 
necessarily be the prologue for the future. Just as the Army 
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has chosen the FMTV to be the truck to take our soldiers to 
victory, so too, the Army should choose the PM to- be the 
leader to take our allies through Foreign Military Sales. 
The PM is the project advocate and 'product' expert; let him 
blaze the trail for international sales! 
B.   SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis of the Thailand and Kuwait FMS 
cases presented in Chapter IV of this thesis, as well as, 
conclusions in Chapter V, the following recommendations are 
provided. These recommendations seek to promote increased 
interest and effective implementation for future 
international sales of new production weapons systems, 
including  tactical wheeled vehicles. 
1.   The Current FMS Policies Should Be Revised To 
Reflect The PM's Lead In All New Production FMS Cases 
All applicable FMS policies should be revised to 
reflect the leadership of the PM in all LOA phases, 
specifically allowing the PM to continue promoting 
equipment in response to customer inquiries. These policies 
should establish clear parameters and guidance, addressing 
both the FMS of new production items, and pertinent ethical 
issues relevant to the sale of defense items to foreign 
Governments. Because new production vehicle systems are 
managed solely by the PM, the leadership of the PM is 
necessary to fulfill the contract requirements of the FMS 
agreement. Additionally, the Tank - Automotive Command 
Security Assistance Center policies should be revised to 
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reflect that they should perform only  the administrative and 
legal activities for FMS agreements. 
2. FMS Funding Should Be Provided To The PMO 
Due to the increasing amount of FMS cases and quantity 
of FMS functions performed by the PMO, funding for FMS 
activities should be allocated to the Project Management 
Office. Adequate resourcing provides the PMO with the 
ability to effectively perform those activities necessary 
(such as truck demonstrations) to ensure a successful 
consummation of an FMS agreement. 
3. The PM Should Encourage A Good Working 
Relationship With The Contractor 
Examination of the FMS cases revealed that the PM 
should work to foster a good relationship with the 
contractor, encouraging an environment of trust and mutual 
respect. A good relationship between the PM and the 
contractor lends itself to a smoother dialog of information 
sharing and cooperation. A good relationship with the 
contractor is not unethical, so long as the PM continues to 
exhibit the military professionalism imputed upon his 
position as a military member of the U.S. Government. 
4. The U.S. Should Seek Alliances To Preserve The 
U.S. Leadership Position In Weapon Systems Exports 
If the U.S. does not seek alliances with allied 
nations, or continue to market superior weapon systems, 
export sales will suffer, resulting in a negative impact on 
the U.S. industrial base. Because FMS is one of the few 
alternatives left for defense companies to stay in business, 
the continual worldwide marketing of U.S. weapon systems is 
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important for the survival of the U.S. industrial base. 
With the increasing growth of European competitors in the 
arms market, alliances promoting codevelopment and 
coproduction projects could seek to preserve the U.S. 
leadership in future weapon systems exports. 
5. The Current FMS Vehicle Process Should Be Revised 
The current FMS process should be revised to depict the 
PM's leadership role during all LOA phases. As Table 1 
illustrates, the majority of actions and information 
constituting the development of the LOA is currently 
performed by the PMO, therefore the agency responsible for 
these actions should lie with the PM, not the security 
assistance community. However, the security assistance 
community should continue performing approval and 
administrative activities, and provide the legal oversight 
for the FMS agreement. (Table 2 depicts the proposed FMS 
process with the PM performing the leadership role 
throughout all the various LOA phases.) 
6. Organization Of The PEO-TWV Should Be Restructured 
Due  to  the  increasing  role  of  the  PM  in  FMS 
transactions, the addition of a new position to manage all 
FMS transactions and international operations should be 
considered. With respect to FMS, the current interaction and 
communication climate between the PMO and the security 
assistance community does not lend itself to effective 
information sharing. However, this new position could 
facilitate a synergistic exchange of information with the 
security assistance community, and provide leadership for 













WITH PM LEAD 
1. Pre-LOA Phase DSAA PM PM 
Pre-LOA Discussions DSAA PM PM 
Requirements Determination DSAA PM . PM 
LOR Submitted DSAA DSAA DSAA 
Security Asst Review DSAA DSAA DSAA 
Review of Congressional Data DSAA DSAA DSAA 
Decision to Act on LOR DA DCSLOG DA DCSLOG DA DCSLOG 
2. LOA Development Phase TSAC PM PM 
LOA Negotiations TSAC TSAC/PM TSAC/PM 
Assigned Country Manager TSAC TSAC TSAC 
Case Identifier Assigned TSAC TSAC TSAC 
Request Vehicle Pricing Quotes TSAC PM PM 
Request for Price Adjustments TSAC PM PM 
LOA Item Identification: TSAC PM PM 
Delivery of Vehicles TSAC PM PM 
Paint Color TSAC PM PM 
Concurrent Spare Parts TSAC TSAC/PM PM 
Support Maintenance TSAC PM PM 
Publications TSAC PM PM 
Training Items TSAC PM PM 
Quality Assurance Teams TSAC PM PM 
Pricing for all Items TSAC PM PM 
Transmittal of LOA DSAA DSAA DSAA 
DA Approval for LOA DA DCSLOG DA DCSLOG DA DCSLOG 
DoD Approval for LOA DSAA DSAA DSAA 
3.   LOA Implementation Phase TSAC PM PM 
Payment Schedule USASAC USASAC USASAC 
Delivery Schedule TSAC PM PM 
Initial Deposit TSAC PM PM 
Cost Summary TSAC TSAC/PM PM 
Requisitions for Parts;   Support 
Support Items; Maintenance 
TSAC PM PM 
Request to Obligate Money 
to Buy Vehicles. 
DSAA/TSAC DSAA/TSAC DSAA/TSAC 
Modification of Contract TSAC PM PM 
Customer Signature on FMS 
Case 
USASAC/TSAC USASAC/TSAC USASAC/TSAC 
4.   LOA Execution TSAC PM PM 
Funds Requisitioned TACOM Matrix PM/TACOM Matrix PM/TACOM Matrix 
Production Performed PM PM PM 
Delivery of Vehicles TSAC PM Will Perform PM 
Quality Assurance Inspections TSAC PM Will Perform PM 
Table 2.  Proposed New Vehicle FMS Process With PM Lead 
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In conjunction with this organizational change, a 
Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) change reflecting 
this new position should also occur. As FMS continues to 
become a significant part of the acquisition effort in the 
years to come, it will require more financial and personnel 
resources. A change to the TDA could ensure the manning of 
a position that would ensure the continual synergistic 
interaction among the security assistance community, the 
customer and the Project Manager. Additionally, it would 
also assist in the validity for receiving FMS funding to 
support all FMS transactions. (Figure 8 depicts the proposed 
organizational structure of the PEO-Tactical Wheeled Vehicle 
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Figure 8.  Proposed Organizational Structure of the PEO-TWV. 
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C.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas are recommended for additional 
research: 
1. Direct Commercial Sales Versus FMS 
As foreign Governments continue to modernize their 
military equipment, international sales are becoming 
increasingly more important to Project Managers. Further 
research into direct commercial sales versus FMS should be 
conducted to determine the costs and benefits of both 
methods of sale to the U.S. Government. Further, research 
should determine if any policy changes are necessary to 
encourage these sales, and how the current role of the PM 
should change with respect to direct commercial sales. 
2. Codevelopment And Coproduction Of Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicles 
Research should be conducted to determine the 
feasibility of codevelopment and coproduction for trucks. As 
the U.S. continues to downsize, and budgets continue to 
wane, codevelopment and coproduction could be viable 




ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This appendix provides answers to the research 
questions presented in the introduction of this thesis. 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question for this thesis is: What 
should be the functional management role of the PM in the 
FMS process  for new tactical  wheeled vehicles? 
Based on the analysis presented in Chapter IV, the PM 
should perform the functional management roles of leading 
and facilitating. Although the analysis of both FMS cases 
revealed that the security assistance community technically- 
had the lead in both FMS cases, in actuality, it was the 
proactive leadership of the PM performing primarily a 
liaison, or facilitator role between the U.S. and the 
foreign countries that resulted in successful FMS 
transactions. 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
The supporting research questions and their answers for 
this thesis are as follows: 
a. What Security Assistance Agencies Were 
Primarily Involved With The New Vehicle FMS Process, And 
What Activities Of These Agencies Were Actually Performed By 
The Project Management  Office? 
Material presented in Chapter II and Chapter IV of 
this thesis revealed the following information: 
Security assistance agencies primarily involved in 
the FMS process included the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, U.S. 
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Army, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and the 
Tank - Automotive Command Security Assistance Center. 
Analysis of these agencies revealed that the primary 
function of the security assistance community was that of an 
approval authority for LOAs in the FMS process. 
Additionally, the PMO actually performed many actions that 
were the responsibility of the security assistance 
community. (Table 1 depicts the actual activities performed 
by the PMO during the FMTV FMS cases.) 
b. What Are The Ethical Considerations Inherent 
In   FMS   Cases   For   The   PM,   And   What   Is   Their   Impact   On   The 
Process? 
The analysis presented in Chapter IV reveals that 
the ethical considerations that the PM must regard concern 
two major areas: the role of the PM in marketing new U.S. 
defense equipment to foreign countries, and a conflict of 
interest concerning the relationship between the PM and the 
contractor. Actions by the PMO in support of FMS 
transactions could be misconstrued as marketing, however, 
current policy guidelines are unclear. Analysis of both FMS 
cases also identified a potential conflict of interest 
involving the relationship between the PM and the 
contractor. Because the PMO is continually interacting with 
the contractor, actions of the PMO could be misconstrued as 
beneficial to industry. 
With respect to both ethical considerations, their 
impact on the FMS process is significant. The PMs actions 
are dictated first by laws, regulations, and policies which 
establish guidelines for conduct, and then by interpretation 
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and circumstance. However, there is a significant flaw with 
the current laws and procedural guidelines: the U.S. 
Government has not firmly established clear, ethical 
parameters delineating the actions of the PM for marketing 
new production defense items to foreign countries. Because 
these policies are ambiguous, the PM must interpret the 
current guidelines according to the circumstance of the 
situation. The PM's actions result from these 
interpretations. Consequently, these actions may be 
misconstrued as unethical, placing the PM in a precarious 
situation that may hinder future FMS transactions. 
c.        What Is   The   Impact   of  FMS On   The   Industrial 
Base? 
The analysis presented in Chapter IV of this 
thesis reveals that the impact of FMS on the industrial base 
is enormous. First, and most important, FMS encourages 
sustainment of the manufacturing/industrial base. As DoD 
reduces spending for military equipment and services, 
companies in the U.S. defense industrial base seek to 
replace these lost domestic revenues with those obtained 
through Foreign Military Sales. As every billion dollars of 
new defense equipment is exported, approximately 31,000 
American jobs are generated. Additionally, while Army 
programs can enjoy the benefit of increased production rates 
as a result of more exports, industry can enjoy the benefits 
of increased profit. This, in turn, leads to economic 
growth, giving rise to a greater commitment to manufacturing 
defense items. Second, FMS promotes both codevelopment and 
coproduction projects.  These programs  can  lead to  the 
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elimination of trade barriers, thus promoting a healthier 
economy. Third, and specifically with regard to tactical 
wheeled vehicles, FMS provides revenue for future defense 
projects. Fourth, it promotes the stabilizing of the 
industrial base workforce through new production and 
modernization FMS cases. Thus, the impact of the FMS on 
industrial base is immense, as it affects the very 
livelihood of Americans. 
d. What Are The Lessons Learned From The 
Thailand And Kuwait FMS Cases? 
The analysis conducted in Chapter IV, revealed the 
following lessons learned: 
• The PM is the leader and facilitator of the FMS 
transaction. 




The PM is the problem-solver between the U.S. 
and the contractor. 
The PM bridges the gap between the security 
assistance community and the customer. 
The security assistance community has limited 
involvement in the current vehicle FMS process. 
The PMO is not funded to perform all necessary 
FMS activities. 
The current policies do not reflect the efforts 
of the PMO during the FMS case implementation 
process. 
114 
• The PMO is proactive; the security assistance 
community is reactive. 
• The presence of the PMO during the initial 
phases of the FMS is critical in facilitating 
information exchange and minimizing adverse 
affects of cultural differences. 
• Current policies are ambiguous and 
contradictory concerning PM guidance on the 
marketing of U.S. defense equipment. 
• A good working relationship between the PMO and 
the contractor is vital for successful 
implementation of FMS cases. 
• FMS encourages the continued sustainment of the 
manufacturing/industrial base during an era of 
downsizing. 
• Worldwide arms competition may severely hamper 
future sales capabilities of the United States. 
• The current trend of European community 
alliances may require the U.S. to establish 
codevelopment and coproduction alliances to 
preserve the U.S. leadership position in future 
weapon systems exports. 
• The FMS of tactical wheeled vehicles have a 
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